‘위임장’ 검색결과 총 118건 입니다.

예스폼 위임장http://www.yesform.com바로가기
└ 서식분야 랭키1위, 900만 회원이용! 위임장, 위임장 샘플전문 예스폼 (총 1,888건)

무료논문 NDSL (118)

Link page에서 [원문보기] 버튼을 클릭하세요.

[국내논문] 체내 삽입장치를 위한 위임장 기반의 인증 프로토콜

최근 센서 기술의 발달로 인하여 체내삽입장치를 부착한 환자가 언제, 어디서나 의료 서비스를 받을 수 있는 환경으로 변화하고 있다. 그러나, 체내삽입장치를 부착한 환자의 생체정보가 병원관계자(의사, 간호사, 약사 등)에게 전달할 때, 환자의 정보가 제 3자에게 쉽게 노출되어 악용될 수 있는 문제점이 발생되고 있다. 본 논문에서는 제3자가 환자로 위장하여 병원관계자로부터 환자 정보를 쉽게 획득할 수 없도록 유헬스케어 서비스 센터로부터 환자의 위임장을 병원관계자가 전달받는 위임장 기반의 서명 인증 프로토콜을 제안한다. 제안 프로토콜은 환자의 민감한 정보를 제 3자에게 노출시키지 않도록 환자의 민감한 정보를 유헬스케어 서비스 센터와 환자가 생성한 랜덤수로 해쉬한 서명키로 환자의 민감한 정보를 암호화한다. 또한 제 3자로부터 환자 정보가 불법적으로 악용되는 것을 예방하기 위해서 환자와 병원관계자 사이의 동기화를 유지함으로써 환자의 생체 정보 유출을 예방할 수 있다.

[국내논문] RSA 문제와 위임장에 기반한 안전한 대리서명 기법

대리서명기법은 대리서명자로 하여금 원서명자를 대신해서 대리로 서명할 수 있도록 구성한 서명 방식을 말한다. 대리서명의 기본 요구조건으로는 위조 불가능성 및 위임 검증 가능성이 있다. 현재까지 다양한 대리서명기법들이 제시되어 왔으나 기본 요구조건들의 복합적인 공격유형에 대해서 안전성 검증이 이루어 지지 못하였다. 특히 RSA 문제에 기반 한 대리서명기법들은 위임 검증 가능성 측면에서 가장 공격(Impersonating Attack)에 취약함이 제시되어 공격자가 자신의 개인키로 원서명자의 동의나 인증 없이 유효한 대리서명의 생성이 가능하다. 본 논문에서는 복합적 공격유형인 가장 공격에서의 안전성 검증이 가능한 새로운 대리서명기법으로 RSA문제와 인증서 기반의 위임장을 활용한 대리서명기법을 제안하였으며 타 대리서명기법들과 효율성 측면에서 비교해 보았다.

[국내논문] 위임장권유와 주주총회결의의 취소

An attempt by a group to obtain the proxy of other members to vote on their behalf in an organizational ballot is so called a proxy fight. Shareholders can achieve the management control of a target company without directors" agreement of a target company by collecting enough proxy to pass the directors" proposal. In other words it is quite significant that proxy solicitation is one of ways to obtain the management control of the target company without obtaining shares or the consent of the company"s directors.

If shareholders, who are offered proxy solicitation are given and understood enough information to examine the proxy, entrust their rights to vote, they want to express their opinions when exercising their rights to vote in the shareholders" meeting. This is the most important factor in the system of proxy solicitation. In the case of a listed company"s proxy solicitation, proxy solicitor is obligated to deliver the proxy paper and reference materials to shareholders. They make sure that the proxy paper must have blanks in which the shareholders can express their agreement or disagreement for each proposal. The reference materials include the necessary information for the proposal, the shareholder who proposes and the proxy solicitor. For a listed shareholders" meeting, you can often see that the company prepares small token of appreciation to prevent the lack of quorum as a result of shareholders" indifference. This act seems to be against the Commercial Law, the article of 467, 2, but if it"s resonable in the sense of social practice it can be seen to be allowed.

[국내 회의자료] 전자위임장 기반 전자거래 활성화 방안

원 서명자를 대신해 거래 관련 제 3자가 서명을 수행하는 대리서명의 실행이 필요한 경우 원 서명자의 서명 위임 사실을 증명하는 위임장이 요구되어진다. 위임장을 전자 거래에 적용하기 위해서는 전자위임장에 관한 표준 프로파일 정의, 전자위임장의 배포 및 검증 방법에 대한 처리 기준이 마련되어야 하며 이를 기반으로 하는 사무 처리 모델이 제시되어야 한다. 이러한 전자위임장 기반구조상에서 다양한 유형의 온/오프라인 거래에 전자위임장을 적용함으로써 전자거래의 활성화에 기여할 수 있을 것으로 판단된다.

[국내논문] 위임장권유제도의 ‘권유’ 개념과 적용범위 -미국의 위임장규칙을 중심으로-

The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission(SEC)'s proxy rules are derived from Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act which generally provides that it is unlawful for any person to solicit proxies, consents or authorizations with respect to a security registered under Section 12 without complying with the proxy rules. If proxies, consents or authorizations are not solicited in advance of an annual or special meeting of stockholders, Section 14(c) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for an issuer to take action at the meeting unless it first files with the SEC and sends to its shareholders substantially equivalent information which would have been required had a solicitation been made in U.S. 65)Recently, the cases of proxy solicitations have little by little increased in Korea, but it has remained unsettled whether an action of security holders is 'solicitation' or not. In U.S, section 14(a) of the Exchange Act generally provides the definition of 'solicitation', and SEC provides it in Rule 14a-1(1) of the Exchange Act about the term in detail. Rule 14a-1(1) of the Exchange Act defines a 'solicitation' to include providing a proxy card or other communication to shareholders under circumstances 'reasonably calculated' to result in the procurement,withholding or revocation of a proxy. Korea also has same rules, but Korea's rule has not clear tests whether the underlying purpose was to influence shareholders. However, In making this analysis, the SEC considers (a) the content of the communication; (b) the proximity of it to the meeting or contest; (c) the audience receiving it; and (d) the commonality of interests of the contestants with the communication and the proxy.We suggest that Korea should also introduce just the SEC's considering, general exemptions in Rule 14a-2(a)(1) and other exemptions in Rule 14a-2(b). The SEC's proxy rules are derived from Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act which generally provides that it is unlawful for any person to solicit proxies, consents or authorizations with respect to a security registered under Section 12 without complying with the proxy rules. If proxies, consents or authorizations are not solicited in advance of an annual or special meeting of stockholders, Section 14(c) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for an issuer to take action at the meeting unless it first files with the SEC and sends to its shareholders substantially equivalent information which would have been required had a solicitation been made.

[국내논문] 적대적 M&A 공격방법의 개선과제 - 공개매수와 위임장권유를 중심으로

Recently, hostile M&A is increased in business world of Korea and have served as popular topic. Especially, in relation to foreign competitors and/or hedge funds defensive tactics against hostile M&A are discussed. But there is almost no discussion about improvement of offensive tactics. However, in order to develope the M&A market in Korea, offensive tactics with defensive tactics are necessary to be arranged. Both defender and offender need to have fair and equal weapons. But existing offensive tactics have some problems in view of refinement. This article describes and analyzes the current takeover offensive tactics of Securities Exchange Act in Korea, and proposes some improvements. This article, in particular, focus on tender offer and proxy solicitations, and introduces duties of board of directors in U.S.A and EU relating to hostile M&A.

[국내논문] 미국연방위임장규칙의 개정 동향과 시사점

Rule 14a-8 permits shareholders to include proposals in the company’s proxy statement. This Rule contains a number of substantive grounds for exclusion, including proposals relating to the election of directors. The election exclusion has evolved to allow for the omission of proposals that specifically affect an upcoming election. Until 2010, the exclusion applied to proposals that would have allowed shareholders to include nominees in company proxy materials. This article argues the SEC has impeded shareholder franchise through the election exclusion under Rule 14a-8. Especially, Part Ⅱ and Ⅲ traces the admin-istrative history of the exclusion and analyzes the SEC staff’s (the staff) interpretation. Part Ⅳ discusses more recent developments regarding the exclusion including changes to shareholder access to the nomination process. Part Ⅴ considers the problems presented by the exclusion and pro-poses a narrower staff interpretation. Election to the board of directors represents perhaps the most important function for shareholders. Directors not shareholders- manage the company. Accordingly, as a means of holding elected representatives accountable and providing incentives for directors to focus on shareholder interests, “the powers of corporate democracy are at (the shareholders’) disposal to turn the board out.” SEC Rule 14a-8, however, restricts shareholders’ ability to influence board composition. From the outset, the Commission prohibited the use of the Rule to nominate directors. The Rule likewise prohibited shareholders from including proposals in the proxy statement that would have provided access to the proxy materials for their nominees. While the 2010 revisions provided shareholders with greater flexibility, staff interpretation continues to restrict shareholder efforts to influence the composition of the board.

[국내논문] 미국의 주주총회 및 위임장권유제도에 관한 연구

Many Korean listed companies (public corporations) have had difficultiesin holding general meetings of stockholders these days. They have solved thisproblem using the 'shadow voting' in the shareholders' meeting. However,since the shadow voting will be abolished in the near future (from January the1st, 2015), many listed companies will have to find other alternatives and one ofthem could be the electronic voting of which Ministry of Justice of Koreaproposed applying phased obligation. Another alternative could be vitalizationof the proxy solicitation, and this article reviews the American proxy solicitationsystem. In the United States, many proxy solicitations are used so thatmanagement may fulfill the quorum and outsiders may take over control of acompany. In the United States, every solicitation statement should explain theprocedure of shareholder proposal, and if shareholders notice any appropriateproposal to the manager of issuer in time before the shareholders' meeting, theissuer should include the proposal in the proxy statement issued for theshareholders' meeting. If minority shareholders or a group of shareholdersrequest, Korean management should be obligated to include minority shareholder's proposals in the proxy statement which management made for theirown proxy solicitation, unless minority shareholder's proposals are inappropriate,following the American system. Meanwhile, the electronic proxy solicitation has been developed in theUS. Especially, 'notice and access proxy model' SEC Rule 14a-16 adopted inJanuary, 2009 could be introduced to the Korean Capital Market Law. Inaddition, electronic voting, electronic proxy voting and electronic forum could beallowed in order to broaden shareholders' participation in the corporatemanagement. And if the electronic voting, electronic proxy solicitation, etc. were invigorated through transfer agents and proxy solicitation firms like in theUnited States, many Korean issuers could save time and expense they put in forshareholder policy.

[국내논문] 주주총회의 활성화와 위임장권유 -일본의 경우를 중심으로-

To let a company continue to develop and sustain by enhancing its management efficiency, stockholders as the owner of a company can make decisions on basically important issues of the company. To guarantee this, the corporate laws in different countries state shareholders’ meeting as the highest decision maker as well as a permanent system. And yet, with recent advance of globalized firms and their shareholders moving around different countries not just living in their home countries, questions are raised on whether shareholders’ meeting is regularly held, and also the issue of its framework becomes serious. The absence in the shareholders’ meeting is problematic since companies can not run business smoothly and shareholders as a good steward of managers’ management can not exercise their rights through their voting rights. In this respect, writing and electronic voting systems as well as proxy solicitation system are allowed to vitalize shareholders’ meeting. Asking shareholders to exercise voting rights instead of absentees is possible and to do so, giving a letter of proxy to a proxy is usual. In that sense, it is called Proxy Solicitation System. This proxy solicitation system is mostly used by companies, but recently it is also used by shareholders who are against the management of a company. Researches show that advisory agencies regarding the proxy persuasion are actively working about exercising voting rights in shareholders’ meeting in advanced countries including the US. E-voting system allows shareholders to freely exercise their rights anywhere. Proxy solicitation system prevents shareholders from giving up the voting rights allowing a proxy to exercise his right. Operating these two systems appropriately can vitalize shareholders’ meeting and they can be evaluated as a system that can watch and supervise managers efficiently.

[국내논문] 전자투표제도와 전자위임장권유제도의 운영현황과 개선과제

Shareholders are the ‘owners’ of a joint-stock corporation and the shareholders’ meeting functions as a forum where shareholders affirm their ownership of the corporation. However, the shareholders’ meeting, nowadays, has become perfunctory, deviating from its original intent due to the shareholders’ lack of interest. The ‘fictionalized shareholders’ meeting’ could be overcome by electronizing each stage of the meeting process, which makes it more accessible for shareholders.In Korea, the procedure for the convocation of shareholders’ meetings was digitalized by adopting an electronic notification system and by utilizing the Financial Supervisory Service’s Electronic Disclosure System. Moreover, exercising voting rights electronically has been made possible by adopting the Electronic Voting System (‘E-Voting’) and Electronic Proxy Solicitation System (‘E-Proxy’).Although E-Voting was introduced by the amendment of the Commercial Act of Korea in 2009, it was not widely used by the public. This year, there was a sharp rise in the usage of E-Voting and E-Proxy introduced by an amendment of the Capital Market Act in connection with the abolishment of Shadow Voting.Accordingly, this year can be referred to as the actual enforcement year of both systems. Based on my experience as the manager of the systems, I have compiled and categorized numerous issues arising from current operational procedures, and suggested specific solutions to amend those problems.Above all, I have presented the acceptability of ‘simultaneous E-Voting’ as well as ‘preliminary E-Voting’, which is currently being used. In addition, I have compiled the main points regarding the debate over mandatory E-voting, and expressed my personal opinion on this issue. Lastly, I have questioned the inappropriateness of the current legal basis for the E-Proxy, Article 160(5) of Capital Market Act Enforcement Decree, and provided a legal alternative by referring to US SEC Rule 14a-16 that is legal basis for US E-Proxy.

[국내논문] 전자투표제도 의무화의 필요성과 그 이유 -서면투표 $위임장투표와의 비교 -

In accordance with the 2009 amendment of the Commercial Act, shareholders may exercise the voting right electronically without being physically present at the shareholder meeting (Article 368-4,Section 1, Commercial Act), so called the “Electronic Voting System”. Although it has been 4 years since the enforcement of the system, few companies have adopted it. One of reasons being is that the adoption of the electronic voting system is not required under the law but only depends on the discretion of the board of directors.As such, the amendment of the Commercial Act has been promulgated to make the electronic voting system mandatory. According to the amendment, a listed company having more than certain number of shareholders shall allow its shareholders to exercise their voting right through an electronic method without being physically present at the shareholder meeting (Article 542-14, Commercial Act).Therefore, such listed company shall permit electronic voting if shareholders desire such. This is in a contrast to the past that shareholders were not allowed to vote electronically without a relevant resolution of the board of directors, even when shareholders have desired such.There are many critics against the mandatory electronic voting system. However, the mandatory electronic voting system is the best legislation to provide an opportunity to shareholders, who cannot be physically present at the shareholder meeting, to exercise their voting rights, especially considering that the adoption of voting in writing and proxy system still depend on the discretion of the board of directors. Unless the current electronic voting system is not amended, shareholders who cannot be physically present will be able to exercise their voting right only when the board of directors decides.

[국내논문] 주주총회 의결권 행사의 활성화 방안 -전자위임장 권유제도 및 전자투표를 중심으로-

Owing to the revision of Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act (“the FISCMA)” in 2013, the Shadow Voting system is scheduled to be eradicated from January 1, 2015. However, 2014 revision of the FISCMA postpones the eradication of the Shadow Voting system until December 31, 2017. There are several way to exercising shareholders' voting rights without participating actual shareholders' meeting, including written ballots(§ 368-3⑴ of the Commercial Act), electronic voting(§ 368-4 of the CA), proxy voting(§ 368⑶ of the CA), proxy solicitation(§§ 152-158 of the FISCMA). Since there is three percent voting cap regarding electing statutory auditor or directors for audit committee, some of listed companies seem to be confronted with difficulties in electing new statutory auditor or directors for audit committee. Therefore, this article reviews proxy solicitation through electronic method and electronic voting system. In order to facilitate shareholders’ voting at shareholders' meeting, the United States introduces electronic proxy solicitation system for listed companies, and the Japan implements compulsory written ballot for large scale companies. This article suggests that Korea shall introduce electronic proxy solicitation system. In establishing that system it recommends “notice and access” model of the United States. Also this article proposes to revise the FISCMA that all listed company shall at least introduce either written ballots (or electronic voting) or electronic proxy solicitation. In addition, it criticizes current system that the company has the option whether or not introducing electronic voting system or proxy solicitation.

[국내논문] 주주총회 및 위임장권유 제도의 전자화에 관한 연구 - 미국의 제도를 중심으로 -

Since the shadow voting will be abolished from January the 1st, 2015 in Korea, many Korean listed companies will have to find other alternatives such as the electronic voting, proxy solicitation, etc. This article is referring to those kinds of systems of the United States which are so vitalized. Korean government can expand the participation of shareholders in the shareholders’ forum, by allowing corporations to hold the electronic shareholders’ meeting in the future, like in many states of the United States. In addition, Korean corporate law can introduce the electronic proxy solicitation and the electronic proxy voting which are utilized actively in the United States. If so, Korean legislature could adopt a notice system like the notice and access proxy model of SEC Rule 14a-16. Furthermore, financial authorities in Korea will be able to invigorate the shareholders’ meeting by establishing proxy solicitation agency system which has not been used actively in Korea. It could be carried out by certain proxy solicitation firms, for example, Korea Securities Depository which has been a transfer agent and the only electronic voting agency in Korea. Meanwhile, in connection with many data spill accidents which have occurred in Korea recently, Korean financial authorities should also endeavor to protect personal information and prevent voting frauds through the steal or misuse of PINs or other access numbers, by doing research about many cases of the United States.

[국내논문] 시제법적 관점에서 본 한국병합관련 ‘조약’의 효력 - 조약 체결의 형식과 절차를 중심으로

1998년에서 2000년에 걸쳐 일본의 『세카이』지를 무대로 하여 한일 양국 학자들 사이에 이른바 한국병합관련‘조약’의 효력을 둘러싼 치열한 논쟁이 전개된 바 있다. 논쟁은 크게 두 가지 논점을 축으로 하여 전개되었다. 첫째는 이들 ‘조약’이 강박에 의하여 체결되었기 때문에 무효인가하는 문제였다. 둘째는 이들 ‘조약’을 체결하는 형식과 절차에 하자가 있었기 때문에 무효인가하는 문제였다.

후자의 문제를 둘러싼 논쟁의 주체는 이태진 교수와 운노 교수였다. 이태진 교수는, 한국병합관련‘조약’, 그 중에서도 특히 1905년 ‘조약’과 1910년의 병합 ‘조약’과 같은 중요한 조약이 이른바 정식조약이 아닌 약식조약으로 체결된 점, 다시 말해 전권위임장이 부여되지 않았거나 비준이 이루어지지 못하였다는 점, 이를 ‘조약’에 ‘treaty’라는 명칭이 붙어 있지 않고 ‘agreement’, ‘convention’ 등의 명칭이 붙어 있다는 점 등을 근거로 ‘조약’의 무효, 나아가서는 ‘조약’의 불성립을 주장했다.

이에 대하여 운노 교수는, 조약의 체결 형식 여하에 따라 조약의 효력이 달라지는 것은 아니라는 점, 조약은 전권위임장의 부여 없이, 또 비준 없이 체결되고 발효되는 것이 있다는 점, 중요한 정치사안에도 ‘convention’이라는 명칭의 조약이 체결된다는 점을 들어 반론하였다.

어느 쪽의 주장이 시제법적 관점에서, 다시 말해 한국병합관련‘조약’이 체결되던 당시의 실정국제법에 비추어 타당한지를 판단하기 위하여 당시의 대표적인 서양 국제법학자들 및 일본 국제법학자들의 저술들을 살펴볼 필요가 있다. 이들 저술들 속의 관련 서술들을 검토해 보면 다음과 같은 결론을 얻을 수 있다.

첫째로, 조약의 명칭 여하를 기준으로 한국병합관련‘조약’의 성립 여부 또는 유무효를 논할 수는 없다. 둘째로, 한국병합관련‘조약’이 체결되던 시기에 일정한 직책에 있는 사람은 전권위임장 없이 조약을 체결할 수 있다는 것이 인정되었다. 그러나 외무장관이나 외교사절이 아닌 사람에게는 전권위임장이 반드시 요구되고 있었으므로, 일정한 직책에 있지 않은 사람이 전권위임장 없이 체결한 조약이 무효라고 하는 것은 당시의 법에 비추어 타당한 주장이라고 볼 수 있다. 셋째로, 특별한 사정이 없는 한 당시에 조약은 비준에 의하여 발효하는 것으로 인식되고 있었다. 조약은 비준되는 것이 원칙이었으며, 비준 없이 조약이 발효하는 것은 예외에 속하였다. 그런 점에서 한국병합관련‘조약’과 관련하여 비준서의 결여나 비준과 관련된 하자를 논거로 하는 무효론은 당시의 국제법이 비추어 상당한 설득력이 있다. 넷째, 당시의 조약 체결관행을 보면 모든 조약은 이태진 교수가 말하는 이른바 ‘정식조약’으로 체결되는 것이 원칙이었다.

이태진 교수의 주장은 역사학자가 국제법적 문제를 다루는데서 오는 일부 오류가 있으나 그 가장 중요한 논지, 즉 국권 이양과 같은 중대 사안을 전권위임장이나 비준 없이 체결된 조약으로 처리할 수 없으므로 한국병합관련‘조약’은 무효라는 주장은 시제법적인 관점에서 충분한 타당성이 있는 것이다.

1/6 페이지
1/6 page
더보기

뷰어 다운로드

문서공유 뉴스레터 구독하기

전체보기

* 최신 문서공유 자료를 받으실 수 있습니다.

Today Ranking

  1. su******250,000
  2. 17**********150,000