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The social enterprise is an organization that applies commercial strategies to maximize improvements in human and environmental well-being, rather than maximizing profits for external shareholders. Social enterprises can be structured as a for-profit or non-profit, and may take the form of a co-operative, mutual organization, a social business, or a charity organization. So, this paper survey research to check how's helping of social enterprise consulting as accounting and taxes.Survey result are following. First, as accounting consulting, most of social enterprise helped their's booking accounting such as manage of expense document, understand of financial statement, learn of accounting cycle, study program booking etc. Also, as taxes consulting, social enterprise helped their's report of taxes such as learn value-added tax, withholding tax of labor, study corporate tax etc. Most consulted social enterprise need to learn accounting and taxes continually.Government improve social enterprise easily and simplification. They need to support easily form of accounting like SME(Accounting Standards for Small- and Medium-sized Entities) and teaching update account and taxes program. Also they check role of taxes and accounting to support social enterprise.In Korea, SEPA(Social Enterprise Promotion Act) has been established and SEPA contribute to the enhancement of social unity. Also, SEPA contribute to the quality of life of citizens by supporting social enterprise in the creation of new job opportunities and the expansion of social services that have been undersupplied in our society.

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This study is to determine the factors that have an effect on taxpayer satisfaction in tax agency services and adoption of tax agency. It is difficult for general taxpayers to properly interpret and apply relevant tax rules by themselves because tax laws are so complex and change frequently. So they rely on tax agents to help and perform their tax duties. This paper examines whether the tax service quality of a tax agent effects the taxpayer¡¯s satisfaction and adoption tax agency of taxpayer. Also we study whether the tax service quality of a tax agent effected exchange of tax agency. Prior studies show that five qualities of tax service, namely, profession, faith, economy, convince, and consent affect the taxpayer¡¯s satisfaction. The results of this study are as follows. The study shows that tax agency service factors have significant effect on user satisfaction and adoption of tax agency. The result has also shows that the tax agency service factors have significant effect on exchange of tax agency.

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Although Korea has not had much difficulty in securing tax revenues due to the continuous growth of the economy, it has not been a big social issue even though most tax evasions have been generalized, but cash import industries such as self£­employed businesses, high£­income occupations, and entertainment restaurants. The issue of unbalanced tax burden between employees and salaries has been raised, and the inequality of tax burden between income types and classes has adversely affected, such as lowering the credibility of tax administration.The Internal Revenue Service has been strengthening its tax investigation every year, focusing on in£­depth investigations centered on voice and fugitive income earners, the main cause of inequality, but the general survey of a large number of taxpayers is at an appropriate level due to the limitations of the manpower and organization. In the case of the frontline tax office, the tax investigation cannot be properly conducted due to the lack of manpower and heavy work.Therefore, the government is constantly innovating about tax investigations, and in the 21st century¡¯s rapidly changing cleaning environment, tax administration innovation to secure the credibility of the people is not a matter of choice but of survival. The tax investigation administration is not carried out under the policy direction of securing the national fiscal demand, but rather the policy direction to automatically secure the national fiscal demand by raising the taxpayer¡¯s self£­assessment payment level through securing the national credibility of the tax administration. It should be done within the framework of.

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This study is primarily to analyze nature of relationship between tax clients and tax representatives, mainly reasons why a client wants to hire a representative and factors influencing their decision on whom to hire. In addition, this study is to compare newly obtained results with ones from the previous studies. From the result of the study, we concluded that the main reasons why clients want to hire representatives is to gain accurate tax calculation and saving tax. We also found that level of service quality and hiring expense are the most influential factors when they select a representative. But it seemed that each client's characteristics had no influence on the same matter. The results obtained in this study were very similar to the previous ones, from which we concluded that the characteristics of general clients haven't been changed, despite of many environmental changes over time. It also has been confirmed once again in this study that characteristics of a client is not an influential factor on the decision whom to hire and only have an influence over decisions that an already-hired representative ought to make. Considering that general characteristics of clients remain the same as the result shows, representatives should pay more attention to provide even more satisfaction for their clients.

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ÀÌ¿¡ º» ¿¬±¸´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º(auditor-provided tax services)°¡ °ú¿¬ °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÁ¶Á¤ÇàÀ§(earnings management)¸¦ Áõ°¡½ÃÅ°¸é¼­ µ¿½Ã¿¡ °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ Á¶¼¼ºÎ´ãÀ» °ø°ÝÀû(aggressively)À¸·Î °¨¼Ò½ÃÅ°´ÂÁö¸¦ °ËÁõÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÑ´Ù. °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¸¦ ±¸¸ÅÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â ÀÇ»ç°áÁ¤°úÁ¤¿¡¼­ °æ¿µÀÚ´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¿Ü°ü»ó µ¶¸³¼ºÈѼÕ(loss of independence in appearance)¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÎÁ¤ÀûÀÎ ½ÃÀå¹ÝÀÀ(À繫º¸°íºñ¿ë)°ú °¨»ç¿Í ¼¼¹«ºÐ¾ß °£ Áö½ÄÀÌÀüÈ¿°ú(knowledge-spillover between audit and tax field)·Î Á¶¼¼ºÎ´ãÀ» È¿À²ÀûÀ¸·Î Àý°¨½Ãų ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ±âȸ(Á¶¼¼ºñ¿ë)¸¦ °í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù(Scholes and Wolfson, 1992). ¸¸¾à °æ¿µÀÚ°¡ ºÎÁ¤ÀûÀÎ ½ÃÀå¹ÝÀÀ¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í ÇöÇà °¨»çÀÎÀ¸·ÎºÎÅÍ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¸¦ ±¸¸ÅÇÑ´Ù¸é ÀÌ´Â Á¶¼¼ºÎ´ã ÃÖ¼ÒÈ­ÀÇ À¯ÀÎÀÌ »ó´ëÀûÀ¸·Î °­ÇÏ°Ô ÀÛ¿ëÇÑ °á°úÀ̸ç(ÀÌ¿µÇÑ․À±¼º¸¸, 2010), ºñ°¨»ç¼­ºñ½ºÀÇ ÀÏÁ¾ÀÎ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¸¦ Á¦°ø¹Þ°Ô µÇ¸é °¨»çÀΰúÀÇ °æÁ¦À¯´ë°ü°è(economic bonding)°¡ °­È­µÇ¾î °á±¹ °¨»çÀÎÀº °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÁ¶Á¤ÇàÀ§¿¡ ´ú º¸¼öÀûÀΠŵµ(less conservative)¸¦ °ßÁöÇÏ°Ô µÈ´Ù(Beck et al., 1988). º» ¿¬±¸ÀÇ °¡¼³Àº ´ÙÀ½°ú °°´Ù. ù°, À繫º¸°í Ãø¸é¿¡¼­ °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¿Í °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÁ¶Á¤Å©±â´Â ¾ç(+)ÀÇ °ü·Ã¼ºÀ» °¡Áú °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹ÃøÇÏ¿© ¨ç°¨»çÀÎÀ» ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀÎÀ¸·Î °í¿ë(employ)ÇÑ Ã¹ ȸ°è¿¬µµÀÇ Àç·®Àû ¹ß»ý¾×ÀÇ Àý´ë°ªÀÌ Áõ°¡Çϸç, ¨è±× °è¾à°ü°è¸¦ °è¼Ó À¯Áö(retain)ÇÏ´Â ¿¬µµ¿¡µµ Áõ°¡ÇÒ °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹»óÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ¨é°¨»çÀÎÀ» ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀÎÀ¸·Î¼­ ÇØ°í(dismiss)ÇÑ È¸°è¿¬µµ¿¡´Â Àç·®Àû ¹ß»ý¾×ÀÇ Àý´ë°ªÀÌ °¨¼ÒÇÒ °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹»óÇÏ¿´´Ù. µÑ°, ¼¼¹«º¸°í Ãø¸é¿¡¼­´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¿Í °ø°ÝÀû ¼¼¹«º¸°í¼öÁØÀÌ ¾ç(+)ÀÇ °ü·Ã¼ºÀ» °¡Áú °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹ÃøÇÏ¿© ¼¼¹«º¸¼ö¿Í ºñÁ¤»ó ¼¼¹«º¸¼ö(abnormal tax fee)°¡ Ŭ¼ö·Ï °æ¿µÀÚ°¡ Á¶¼¼ºÎ´ãÀ» °ø°ÝÀûÀ¸·Î °¨¼Ò½Ãų °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹»óÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¼Â°·Î´Â À繫¿Í ¼¼¹«º¸°íÃø¸é ¸ðµÎ¸¦ °í·ÁÇÑ »óȲ ÇÏ¿¡¼­, °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º°¡ °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÁ¶Á¤Å©±â¸¦ Áõ°¡½ÃÅ°¸é¼­ µ¿½Ã¿¡ °ø°ÝÀûÀÎ ¼¼¹«º¸°í¸¦ °­È­½ÃÄÑ È¸°èÀÌÀÍ°ú °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀÇ ÀÏÄ¡¼öÁØ(conformity of book and taxables income)À» ³·Ãâ °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹ÃøÇÏ¿© ¨ç°¨»çÀÎÀ» ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀÎÀ¸·Î °í¿ë(employ)ÇÑ Ã¹ ȸ°è¿¬µµ¿¡ ȸ°èÀÌÀÍ°ú °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀÇ ÀÏÄ¡¼öÁØÀÌ ³·¾ÆÁú °ÍÀ̸ç, ¨è±× °í¿ë°ü°è¸¦ °è¼ÓÇÏ¿© À¯Áö(retain)ÇÏ´Â ¿¬µµ¿¡µµ Ãß°¡ÀûÀ¸·Î ¾ç ¼ÒµæÀÇ ÀÏÄ¡¼öÁØÀÌ ³·¾ÆÁú °ÍÀ¸·Î ¿¹»óÇÏ¿´´Ù. 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ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ °á°ú´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º°¡ À繫º¸°íÃø¸é¿¡¼­´Â °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ ÀÌÀÍÁ¶Á¤ÇàÀ§¸¦ ´Ã·Á ȸ°èÀÌÀÍÀ» Áõ°¡½ÃÅ°´Â µ¿½Ã¿¡ ¼¼¹«º¸°íÃø¸é¿¡¼­´Â °ø°ÝÀûÀ¸·Î °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ Á¶¼¼ºÎ´ã(°ú¼¼¼Òµæ)À» ÁÙÀÓÀ¸·Î½á ȸ°èÀÌÀÍ°ú °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀÇ ÀÏÄ¡¼öÁØÀ» ³·Ãá´Ù´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ÆǴܵȴÙ. ±×·¯³ª °¨»çÀΰú ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º °è¾àÀ» °è¼Ó À¯ÁöÇÏ´Â °æ¿ì¿¡´Â ¹æÇ⼺Àº ¿¹Ãø°ú ÀÏÄ¡ÇÏ¿´Áö¸¸, Åë°èÀûÀ¸·Î À¯ÀÇÇÏÁö´Â ¾Ê¾Ò´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¼±Ç࿬±¸¿Í´Â ´Ù¸£°Ô Scholes and Wolfson(1992)ÀÇ Æз¯´ÙÀÓÀ» Àû¿ëÇÏ¿© À繫º¸°í¿Í ¼¼¹«º¸°íÃø¸é¿¡¼­ °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º ±¸¸ÅÈ¿°ú¸¦ ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç, ¼¼¹«º¸¼ö °áÁ¤¸ðÇüÀ» ¼³°èÇÏ°í À̸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿© ºñÁ¤»ó ¼¼¹«º¸¼ö¸¦ ÃßÁ¤ÇÏ´Â ½Ãµµ¸¦ ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±×¸®°í °³Á¤µÈ ±¹Á¦À±¸®±âÁØÀÌ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º°¡ °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ÀÚ±â°ËÅä À§Çù°ú µ¶¸³¼ºÈÑ¼Õ À§ÇùÀ» ¹ß»ý½Ãų ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î °£ÁÖÇÏ¿© °¨»ç¿Í µ¿½Ã¿¡ Á¦°øÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø´Â ºñ°¨»ç¼­ºñ½º·Î ±ÔÁ¦ÇÏ°í Àִµ¥, º» ¿¬±¸´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¸¦ °æ¿µÀÚ°¡ °¨»çÀÎÀÇ µ¶¸³¼º ¼öÁØÀ» ³·Ã߸鼭 Á¶¼¼ºÎ´ãÀ» °ø°ÝÀûÀ¸·Î ÁÙÀ̴µ¥ À̸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Ù´Â ½ÇÁõÀû Áõ°Å¸¦ Á¦½ÃÇÔÀ¸·Î½á °¨»çÀÎÀÇ Á÷¹«±ÔÁ¦¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Á¤Ã¥Àû ½Ã»çÁ¡À» Á¦°øÇϴµ¥ ÀÇÀÇ°¡ ÀÖ´Ù°í ÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¿¬±¸ÀÇ °øÇå¿¡µµ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í º» ¿¬±¸´Â ´ÙÀ½°ú °°Àº ÇÑ°èÁ¡À» Áö´Ï°í ÀÖ´Ù. ù°, Á¤È®ÇÑ °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º ±¸¸ÅÈ¿°ú¸¦ ºÐ¼®Çϱâ À§Çؼ­´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÌ ¾Æ´Ñ ¼¼¹«´ë¸®Àο¡°Ô Áö±ÞÇÑ ¼¼¹«º¸¼öÀڷḦ È°¿ëÇÏ¿© °¨»çÀΰú ºñ°¨»çÀÎÀÌ Á¦°øÇÑ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º ±¸¸ÅÈ¿°ú¸¦ ºñ±³ÇØ¾ß Çϳª, º» ¿¬±¸´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÌ ¾Æ´Ñ ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º ±¸¸ÅÈ¿°ú¸¦ ¹èÁ¦ÇÏ¿´´Ù´Â Á¡¿¡¼­ ÇÑ°è°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. µÑ°, ºñÁ¤»ó ¼¼¹«º¸¼ö ÃßÁ¤ÀýÂ÷¸¦ Á¤±³È­(sophisticated)Çϱâ À§Çؼ­´Â °¨»çÀÎÀÌ ¾Æ´Ñ ´Ù¸¥ ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀÎÀ» °í¿ëÇÑ ±â¾÷Ç¥º»¿¡¼­ÀÇ °áÁ¤¿äÀÎÀ» µµÃâÇÏ¿© ±â´ë¼¼¹«º¸¼ö¸¦ ÃßÁ¤ÇÑ ´ÙÀ½, °¨»çÀÎÀ» ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀÎÀ¸·Î °í¿ëÇÑ ±â¾÷Ç¥º»ÀÇ ½ÇÁ¦ Áö±ÞÇÑ ¼¼¹«º¸¼ö¿ÍÀÇ Â÷À̸¦ ±¸ÇÏ¿© ºñÁ¤»ó ¼¼¹«º¸¼ö¸¦ ÃßÁ¤ÇØ¾ß Çϳª, º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¼¼¹«º¸¼öÀÚ·áÀÇ ¼öÁý¿¡ Á¦ÇÑÀÌ ÀÖ¾ú´Ù. ÇâÈÄ ¿¬±¸°úÁ¦´Â ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ÇÑ°èÁ¡À» ±Øº¹ÇÏ¿©, °¨»çÀÎÀÇ ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¸¦ ±¸¸ÅÇÏ´Â ´Ü°è¿¡¼­ ¾î¶² À¯ÀÎÀÌ ÀÛ¿ëÇÏ´ÂÁö ±×¸®°í ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀÎÀ¸·Î¼­ °¨»çÀÎÀ» ÇØ°íÇÏ´Â °æ¿µÀÚÀÇ À¯ÀÎÀÌ ¹«¾ùÀÎÁö¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÐ¼®À» ÇÑ´Ù¸é º» ¿¬±¸º¸´Ù ÇÑ Â÷¿ø ³ôÀº ½ÇÁõ¿¬±¸°¡ Á¦½ÃµÉ °ÍÀ¸·Î ±â´ëµÈ´Ù.

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Many of the start-ups remain very small. Nevertheless, they provide a major source of employment to national economies and their growth in numbers has contributed to the increase of small business sector over the last three decades. This article is focused on finding factors which influence start-up beginnings. Data showing the number of start-ups are employed from Global Entrepreneurship Monitor(GEM) database which are based on representative national samples covering 64 countries. We designed regression models adopting NER(nascent entrepreneurial activity rate) and TEA(total early stage entrepreneurial activity rate) as dependent variables. Independent variables are composed of individual tax rate, corporate tax rate, consumer price index, unemployment rate, flexibility of wage determination, regulation, entrepreneurial education, per capita income, financial service, and average economic growth rate. Regression results show that high individual tax rate is negatively related with start-ups indicating that maintaining low tax rate is beneficial for increasing new businesses. Among nontax variables, education for business people, autonomy of wage setting by each enterprises, and efficient financial service are positively related with start-ups. Otherwise, high per capita income is negatively related with start-ups, which means that established corporations in advanced countries provide better jobs which people prefer to self employment. Additionally, we performed another regression on entrepreneurial intentions(EI) using the same independent variables. Data on EI is also provided by GEM which measures people¡¯s attitudes on future start-ups. Regression results show that tax variables have only insignificant influence on EI. Otherwise, wage and financial service are positively related with EI and per capita income is negatively related with EI, which are the same results with the above regressions. Particularly, entrepreneurial education has lost influence on EI, which means that potential start-ups are not interested in business education. This result is quite different with the aforementioned incumbent business people¡¯s attitudes.

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This study examines the effect of the tax investigation on the corporate tax reporting and discover the effects of the tax adjustments (through the permanent/temporary differences) for the current and next year. Doing so, the aim of this study is to provide the suggestions for the Korean tax authority in the policies regarding the tax investigations. For that purpose this study has examined the natures of the tax adjustments for the taxable corporate incomes in the year of tax investigation, the present reporter has selected the companies as samples among those listed companies in security markets and KOSDAQ which reported additional tax payments upon the tax investigations from 2006 to 2010 business years, and the unlisted companies in Seoul and Seoul Metropolitan region, which were under tax investigations as they were of the corporates subjected to the external auditing) in the same years. The subjects were, of 5 industries, 50 listed companies and 100 unlisted companies. The controls were those in the same industries, that have similar assets and before-tax incomes. This study employs analysis of variance, in analyzing the differences between the samples and controls, the adjustments of taxes; which of the permanent/temporary differences in yearly basis, from 3 years before the tax investigations to the first year after the investigations. Moreover, multiple regression analysis process was applied in determining whether aggressive tax adjustments were made by comparing the differences between a year prior to the tax investigations, and the next year after the investigations, in sample and control companies. The control variances were the percentage of the shares that held by the largest shareholders, the liabilities ratio, company sizes, tax cost, cash flows of business operations, and the year for tax rate deductions. The summary of this study is the followings. First, upon the t-tests to the samples, for the analysis of variance, it seems that in tax investigation year, aggressive tax strategies (reducing the taxable incomes, in comparison with the previous year) were applied, using the permanent/temporary differences; the next year after the tax investigations, the permanent/temporary differences have increased, compared to the tax investigation year. Second, the analysis of the permanent and temporary differences for the samples suggests that, in tax investigation year, the permanent/temporary differences of inclusion of gross revenue are to be reduced, comparing to the previous/next years of the tax investigations. Third, examinations of the controls shows statistically of little differences in permanent/temporary differences, that of the tax investigation year, and the previous/next years. This may be the strong evidence that those have been under the tax investigations adjust the permanent and temporary differences by reducing the taxable incomes in the tax investigation year.

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& & ÇÑ£­EU ¾ç±¹Àº 2007³â 5¿ù FTA Çù»ó ÃßÁøÀ» ¹ßÇ¥ÇÏ¿´°í, µ¿³â 5¿ùºÎÅÍ Çù»óÀÇ ÁøÇàÇϸ鼭 2009³â 7¿ù 13ÀÏ ÇùÁ¤ÀÇ Å¸°áÀ» °ø½ÄÀûÀ¸·Î ¼±¾ðÇÏ¿´À¸¸ç, ¿¹Á¤´ë·Î 2011³â 7¿ù 1ÀϺÎÅÍ ÀáÁ¤ ¹ßÈ¿µÇ¾ú´Ù. ÀÌ¿¡ ÇöÇà ¼¼¹«»ç¹ý¿¡ µû¶ó ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º½ÃÀå 1´Ü°è °³¹æ³»¿ëÀÌ ¹Ì±¹°ú EU ±¹°¡µé¿¡°Ô Àû¿ëµÇ°í ÀÖ°í, 2´Ü°è °³¹æ³»¿ëÀº 2016. 7. 2.ºÎÅÍ EU ȸ¿ø±¹µéºÎÅÍ ¸ÕÀú Àû¿ëµÉ ¿¹Á¤ÀÌ´Ù. ÀÌ·Î ÀÎÇØ ¾ÕÀ¸·Î EU ȸ¿ø±¹ ¹× ¹Ì±¹ ¼Ò¼Ó ¼¼¹«»ç(¼¼¹«¹ýÀÎ)µéÀÌ ±¹³»¹ý¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ Á¦µµÀû ÀåÄ¡(¿Ü±¹¼¼¹«ÀÚ¹®»çÁ¦µµ)¿¡ ÀÇÇØ ±¹³» ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º½ÃÀå¿¡ Á¢±ÙÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¹ßÆÇÀÌ ¸¶·ÃµÇ¾ú°í, ÀÌ·Î ÀÎÇØ ±¹³» ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º½ÃÀå¿¡ ¸¹Àº º¯È­°¡ ÀÖÀ» °ÍÀ¸·Î º¸ÀδÙ.& & ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º´Â ´Ù¸¥ Àü¹®¼­ºñ½º¿¡ ºñÇÏ¿© °³º°±¹°¡¿¡ µû¶ó °íÀ¯ÇÑ µ¶ÀÚ¼ºÀ» °¡Áö°í ÀÖÀ¸¸ç, ³³¼¼Àǹ«ÀÇ ¼º½ÇÇÑ ÀÌÇà°ú ¼¼¹«ÇàÁ¤ÀÇ ¿øÈ°ÇÑ ¼öÇà¿¡ À̹ÙÁöÇÔ°ú µ¿½Ã¿¡ ³³¼¼ÀÚÀÇ ±ÇÀÍÀ» º¸ÀåµÇµµ·Ï ÇØ¾ß ÇÏ´Â °ø°ø¼ºÀÌ ´ãº¸µÇ¾î¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ¿¡ ºÒ±¸ÇÏ°í ¿ì¸®³ª¶ó¿¡¼­´Â ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀνÄÀÇ ºÎÁ·À¸·Î FTA Çù»ó½Ã ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º¸¦ ¹ý·ü¼­ºñ½º ¶Ç´Â ȸ°è¼­ºñ½º ºÐ¾ß·Î °£ÁÖÇÏ¿© ±× µ¶ÀÚ¼ºÀÌ ÈѼÕÇÒ ¿ì·Á°¡ Å©´Ù.& & ÀÌ¿¡ ¸ÕÀú ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½ºÀÇ µ¶ÀÚ¼º µî ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½ººÐ¾ß¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Çù»ó°úÁ¤°ú Çù»ó°á°ú¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¹®Á¦Á¡, ±×¸®°í ÀÔ¹ýÁøÇà°úÁ¤ ÁßÀÇ ÀïÁ¡ÀÌ µÇ¾ú´ø ÁÖ¿ä»çÇ×À» »ìÆì º¸¾Ò´Ù. ±×¸®°í ÀÔ¹ý°úÁ¤¿¡¼­ °£°úµÇ¾ú´ø ¹®Á¦Á¡µéÀÌ ÃßÈÄ °ü·Ã ÀÔ¹ýÇü¼º°úÁ¤¿¡¼­ ÃæºÐÈ÷ °ËÅäµÇ¾îÁú ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï °¢ ÀïÁ¡º°·Î ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀÎ °³¼±¹æ¾ÈÀ» Á¦½ÃÇØ º¸¾Ò´Ù.& & º» ³í¹®ÀÇ ¿¬±¸°á°ú·Î ÀÎÇØ ±¹³» ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º½ÃÀå °³¹æ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ³íÀǸ¦ º¸´Ù È°¼ºÈ­½ÃÅ°°í, ¼¼¹«¼­ºñ½º½ÃÀåÀÇ °³ ¹æÀÌ ¼º°øÀûÀ¸·Î Á¤ÂøµÉ ¼ö Àֱ⸦ ±â´ëÇÑ´Ù.

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[Purpose]This study empiracally investigates how firms¡¯ tax risk appear depending on economic conditions. Specifically, this study analyzes whether the associations of tax risk with the firm characteristic variables are differentiated depending on economic conditions.[Methodology]We analyzed whether there were statistically significant differences in the tax risk of firms when the economic situation was booming or in recession. Further, this study analyzed whether there were significant differences in the associations of tax risk with the firm characteristic variables depending on economic conditions. Research period was 12 years from 2008 to 2019 and final samples consisted of 102 firms which listed in KOSPI & KOSDAQ markets.[Findings]First of all, when economic conditions were booming, tax risk measured by cash effective tax rate was significantly less than tax risk during recession. Therefore, tax risk in terms of cash effective tax rates decreases when the economic situation is more prosperous than when the economy is in recession. However, tax risk measured by effective tax rate was not statistically different as economic conditions. These results suggest that firms are interested in actual liquidity. Further, when the economic situation is booming, tax risk increased as pre£­tax profits were increased or tendency on tax avoidance was stronger. [Implications]The results of this study suggest that it is necessary to consider economic conditions in future studies related to tax avoidance or tax risk.[Findings] First of all, when economic conditions were booming, tax risk measured by cash effective tax rate was significantly less than tax risk during recession. Therefore, tax risk in terms of cash effective tax rates decreases when the economic situation is more prosperous than when the economy is in recession. However, tax risk measured by effective tax rate was not statistically different as economic conditions. These results suggest that firms are interested in actual liquidity. Further, when the economic situation is booming, tax risk increased as pre£­tax profits were increased or tendency on tax avoidance was stronger.[Implications] The results of this study suggest that it is necessary to consider economic conditions in future studies related to tax avoidance or tax risk.

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º» ¿¬±¸¿¡¼­´Â ÀÌ¿ë°¡´ÉÇÑ °ú¼¼ÀÚ·áÀÇ Á¦¾àÀ¸·Î ÀÎÇØ ±¹³» ¹× ¿Ü±¹ÀÇ ¼±Ç࿬±¸¿¡¼­ ´Ù·çÁö ¾ÊÀº ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç °ü·Ã »ç°Çµé¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÁÖ°¡¹ÝÀÀÀ» Á¶»çÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¿Í °ü·ÃµÈ »ç°ÇµéÀº ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç»çÀüÅëÁö, ¼¼¹«Á¶»çÀÇ Âø¼ö, ¼¼¹«Á¶»çÀÇ Á¾°á, °á°úÅëÁö, ºÒº¹Ã»±¸, ¼¼¹«¼Ò¼Û µî°ú °°Àº ÀÏ·ÃÀÇ »ç°ÇÀ¸·Î ±¸¼ºµÇ¾î ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ °¡¿îµ¥ º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç»çÀüÅëÁöÀÏ°ú Âø¼öÀÏÀ» ÇϳªÀÇ »ç°ÇÀÏ·Î °£ÁÖÇÏ°í, ¼¼¹«Á¶»çÁ¾°áÀÏ°ú °á°úÅëÁöÀÏÀ» ¶Ç ÇϳªÀÇ »ç°ÇÀÏ·Î °£ÁÖÇÏ¿© °¢°¢ÀÇ »ç°ÇÀÏÀ» Æ÷ÇÔÇÏ´Â ÀÏÁ¤±â°£ µ¿¾ÈÀÇ AAR(Æò±ÕºñÁ¤»ó¼öÀÍ·ü)°ú CAR(´©ÀûºñÁ¤»ó¼öÀÍ·ü)À» Á¶»çÇÏ¿´´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¸ÕÀú ¼¼¹«´ë¸®ÀεéÀ» ÅëÇØ 158°³ÀÇ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç Ç¥º»À» »çÀû(ÞçîÜ)À¸·Î ¼öÁýÇÏ¿´´Âµ¥, ÀÌ Ç¥º»¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ½ÇÁõºÐ¼®°á°ú¿¡ µû¸£¸é, Àü¹ÝÀûÀ¸·Î ¼¼¹«Á¶»çÀÇ Âø¼ö´Â ÁÖ°¡¿¡ ºÎÁ¤Àû ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¹Ý¸é, ¼¼¹«Á¶»çÀÇ Á¾°áÀº ÁÖ°¡¿¡ ±àÁ¤ÀûÀÎ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¡´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ³ªÅ¸³²À¸·Î½á, ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç °ü·Ã »ç°Ç¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÁÖ°¡¹ÝÀÀÀÌ ÀÏ·üÀûÀÌÁö ¾ÊÀ½À» ¹ß°ßÇÏ¿´´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ¼¼¹«Á¶»çÀÇ ÁÖ°¡°ü·Ã¼º °¡¼³Àº ¾ö¹ÐÇÑ Àǹ̿¡¼­ º¼ ¶§ ¡®¼¼¹«Á¶»ç°¡ ÁÖ°¡¿¡ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¥ °Í¡¯À̶ó´Â °¡¼³°ú ¡®¼¼¹«Á¶»ç°ü·Ã »ç°ÇÀÌ °ø°³µÈ Á¤º¸(public knowledge)¡¯¶ó´Â °¡¼³ÀÌ °áÇÕµÈ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. µû¶ó¼­ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç ´ë»ó±â¾÷ÀÇ ÁÖ°¡°¡ ¿µÇâÀ» ¹Þ´Â´Ù ÇÏ´õ¶óµµ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ °á°ú°¡ ÀüÀûÀ¸·Î ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¿¡ ±â¾ðÇÑ´Ù°í ´Ü¾ðÇϱ⠾î·Á¿î Ãø¸éÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ¹®Á¦Á¡À» ȸÇÇÇϱâ À§ÇØ º» ¿¬±¸´Â °ø½ÃÀÚ·á·ÎºÎÅÍ º°µµÇ¥º»À» ¼öÁýÇÏ¿© Ãß°¡ºÐ¼®À» ½Ç½ÃÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¡¸À¯°¡Áõ±Ç½ÃÀå°ø½Ã±ÔÁ¤¡¹°ú ¡¸ÄÚ½º´Ú½ÃÀå°ø½Ã±ÔÁ¤¡¹¿¡ µû¸£¸é, ÀÚ±âÀÚº»ÀÇ ÀÏÁ¤ºñÀ² ÀÌ»ó¿¡ ÇØ´çÇÏ´Â ¡°¹ú±Ý µî¡±À» ºÎ°úµÈ »ç½ÇÀÌ È®ÀÎµÈ ¹ýÀÎÀº ±× »ç½ÇÀ» »çÀ¯¹ß»ýÀÏ ´çÀÏ¿¡ °Å·¡¼Ò¿¡ ½Å°íÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ¿¡ ±Ù°ÅÇÏ¿© º» ¿¬±¸´Â ±ÝÀ¶°¨µ¶¿ø ÀüÀÚ°ø½Ã½Ã½ºÅÛ(dart.fss.or.kr)À» ÅëÇØ 2000³âºÎÅÍ 2008³â±îÁö Ãß¡¼¼¾×À» °ø½ÃÇÑ 157°³ÀÇ »óÀå±â¾÷À» ÃßÃâÇÑ ÈÄ °ø½ÃÀÏÀ» ÀüÈÄÇÑ ÁÖ°¡¹ÝÀÀÀ» ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ÀÌ Ãß°¡ºÐ¼®¿¡¼­´Â Ãß¡¼¼¾×À» °ø½ÃÇÑ ±â¾÷ÀÇ ÁÖ°¡°¡ °ø»çÀÏ Á÷ÈÄ °Å·¡ÀÏ(+1 °Å·¡ÀÏ)¿¡¼­ À¯ÀÇÀûÀ¸·Î Ç϶ôÇÑ »ç½ÇÀ» °üÂûÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ¾ú´Ù.

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In this study, the public intends to propose a tax adjustment system based on disagreements over the results of the survey, by reviewing the selection of tax investigation targets by the taxation authorities and the fair and reasonable tax investigation methods under the Act and pointing out the problems. To solve these problems, the National Tax Service Act should combine the current tax audit regulations listed in each tax law, including the Income Tax Act, with the National Tax Service Act in consideration of the current tax audit regulations, which are based on the principle of integrated tax audits. It would be fair to change the current title of Chapter 7 of the National Tax Service Act to [the tax investigation and taxpayer right] and to list all matters, including the definition of tax investigation related to tax investigations, type of investigation, selection of those subject to investigation, methods of investigation, and procedure of investigation, and to list how taxpayer's rights should be guaranteed accordingly. Second, a so-called ¡®fair and tax committee¡¯ should be established for the purpose of identifying the type of person to be selected for tax investigation and for the fairness of selecting those to be investigated before being fully reviewed. There are more problems with irregular selection than regular selection. It shall be made clear why the taxpayer should be subject to a tax audit, investigated according to the method of investigation prescribed by law, and saved from unfair taxation, so that fair taxation may be made. Third, the temporary storage survey (old, deposit investigation) conducted in a manner consistent with the current tax code survey should be supplemented or abolished at least. Tax investigations that ignore taxpayer¡¯s rights and interests should not be avoided, as they are equivalent to confiscation and retrieval just because they are suspected of failing to properly report and pay the tax violations. Fourth, in the case of mutual disagreement between the tax authorities and the taxpayers on the results of the tax investigation, the tax adjustment system for the investigation results shall be introduced, and the matters agreed in the adjustment shall be able to terminate the tax obligation with the revised report of the taxpayer. The authority to ask, investigate, question, or inspect the tax laws so far shall be collected under the National Tax Act, a separate chapter related to tax audits shall be created, the target of tax audits shall be selected, and the method of investigation shall be listed, and the tax adjustment shall be made if the results of the investigation are not mutually agreeable to the taxpayer.

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º» ¿¬±¸´Â Çѱ¹°ú ¿Ü±¹ÀÇ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç(tax investigation) ´ë»óÀÚ ¼±Á¤ÀýÂ÷¸¦ ºñ±³ºÐ¼®ÇÏ°í, °ú¼¼´ç±¹(tax authority)¿¡ ÀÇÇÑ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¸¦ ¹ÞÀº ±â¾÷ÀÌ ¿µ±¸ÀûÂ÷ÀÌ(permanent difference)¿Í ÀϽÃÀûÂ÷ÀÌ(temporary difference)¸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÑ ¼¼¹«Á¶Á¤(tax adjustment) ÆÐÅÏ¿¡ ¾î¶°ÇÑ º¯È­¸¦ º¸ÀÌ´ÂÁö¸¦ ½ÇÁõÀûÀ¸·Î ¿¬±¸ÇÏ¿© ±× °á°ú¸¦ Åä´ë·Î °ú¼¼´ç±¹¿¡°Ô À¯¿ëÇÑ Á¤Ã¥ ÀڷḦ Á¦½ÃÇÏ°íÀÚ Çϴµ¥ ¸ñÀûÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â Çѱ¹°ú ¿Ü±¹ÀÇ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç ´ë»óÀÚ ¼±Á¤ÀýÂ÷¿Í ±¸Ã¼ÀûÀÎ ¼±Á¤±âÁØÀ» ¹®Ç忬±¸¸¦ ÅëÇÏ¿© ºñ±³ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¿¬µµ¿¡ ±â¾÷ÀÇ °ú¼¼¼Òµæ(taxable income) Á¶Á¤ ÇàŸ¦ ÆľÇÇÏ°íÀÚ 2000³âºÎÅÍ 2006³â 3¿ù±îÁö ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç Ãß¡¼¼¾×À» °ø½ÃÇÑ À¯°¡Áõ±Ç½ÃÀå°ú ÄÚ½º´Ú½ÃÀå »óÀå¹ýÀÎÀ» Ç¥º»À¸·Î ¼±Á¤ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¿¬±¸°¡¼³Àº ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¸¦ ¹ÞÀº ±â¾÷ÀÌ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¿¬µµ¿¡ ¿µ±¸ÀûÂ÷ÀÌ ¹× ÀϽÃÀûÂ÷À̸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿© Àû±ØÀû ¼¼¹«Á¶Á¤(aggressive tax adjustment)À» ÇÏ´ÂÁö¿¡ °üÇÑ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ¿¬±¸°á°ú¸¦ ¿ä¾àÇÏ¸é ´ÙÀ½°ú °°´Ù. ù°, ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¸¦ ¹ÞÀº ±â¾÷Àº Á¶»ç¿¬µµ¿¡´Â Á÷Àü¿¬µµ¿¡ ºñÇؼ­ ¿µ±¸ÀûÂ÷À̸¦ °¨¼ÒÁ¶Á¤ÇÏ¿© °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀ» °¨¼Ò½ÃÅ°´Â ¹æÇâÀ¸·Î ¼¼¹«Á¶Á¤À» ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â °ÍÀ¸·Î ½ÇÁõºÐ¼®µÇ¾ú´Ù. ºÎäºñÀ²(leverage ratio)Àº ¿µ±¸ÀûÂ÷ÀÌ¿Í Åë°èÀûÀ¸·Î À¯ÀÇÇÑ(significant) À½(-)ÀÇ °ªÀ» ³ªÅ¸³ÂÀ¸¸ç ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç Á÷Àü 5°³³â°£ ¼¼ÀüÀÌÀÍÀÇ ÇÕ°è¾×À¸·Î ÃøÁ¤ÇÑ Á¶¼¼ºñ¿ë(tax cost)Àº ¿µ±¸ÀûÂ÷ÀÌ¿Í À¯ÀÇÇÑ À½(-)ÀÇ °ü°è¸¦ º¸¿´´Ù. ¼¼À²ÀÎÇÏ¿¬µµ¸¦ ÅëÁ¦Çϱâ À§ÇÑ ´õ¹Ìº¯¼ö´Â À¯ÀÇÇÑ À½(-)ÀÇ °ªÀ» º¸ÀÓÀ¸·Î½á ±â¾÷µéÀÌ ¼¼À²ÀÎÇÏ¿¡ ´ëÀÀÇÏ¿© ¼¼À²ÀÎÇÏ Á÷Àü¿¬µµÀÇ °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀ» °¨¼Ò½ÃŲ´Ù´Â ±âÁ¸ÀÇ ¿¬±¸°á°ú¿Í µ¿ÀÏÇÑ °á°ú¸¦ ¾ò¾ú´Ù. µÑ°, ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¸¦ ¹ÞÀº ¿¬µµ¿¡ ±â¾÷ÀÌ ÀϽÃÀûÂ÷À̸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÏ¿© °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀ» °¨¼ÒÁ¶Á¤ÇÑ´Ù´Â ½ÇÁõÀûÀÎ Áõ°Å´Â ¹ß°ßÇÒ ¼ö ¾ø¾ú´Ù. ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ °á°ú´Â ÀϽÃÀûÂ÷ÀÌÀÇ ¹ÝÀüÈ¿°ú·Î ÀÎÇÏ¿© ÀϽÃÀûÂ÷À̸¦ ÀÌ¿ëÇÑ °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀÇ °æ°¨È¿°ú°¡ Èñ¼®µÇ¾î Åë°èÀûÀ¸·Î À¯ÀÇÇÑ °á·Ð¿¡ µµ´ÞÇÏÁö ¸øÇÑ °ÍÀ¸·Î ÃßÁ¤µÈ´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¾à 5³â¸¶´Ù ¹Ýº¹µÇ´Â ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç °üÇà¿¡ ±â¾÷ÀÌ ¾î¶»°Ô ´ëóÇÏ¿© °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀ» °¨¼Ò½ÃÅ°´ÂÁö ½ÇÁõÀûÀ¸·Î °ËÁõÇÏ¿´´Ù´Âµ¥ °øÇåÁ¡ÀÌ ÀÖ´Ù. µû¶ó¼­ º» ¿¬±¸ÀÇ °á°ú¿¡ µû¶ó °ú¼¼´ç±¹ÀÌ ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç ´ë»óÀÚ¸¦ ¼±Á¤ÇÒ ¶§ À繫ºñÀ²À̳ª ¹ÌÁ¶»ç°æ°ú¿¬µµ µîÀÇ ¼±Á¤¿ä¼Ò¿¡ Á÷Àü¿¬µµ¿Í ºñ±³ÇÑ ¿µ±¸ÀûÂ÷ÀÌ º¯µ¿¾×À» ü°èÀûÀ¸·Î °í·ÁÇÑ´Ù¸é Á¶»çÀηÂÀÇ ºÎÁ·À¸·Î ÀÎÇØ ³ªÅ¸³ª´Â ¼¼¹«Á¶»ç¾÷¹«ÀÇ ºñÈ¿À²À» Á¦°ÅÇÏ°í °øÆò°ú¼¼ÀÇ ¿øÄ¢À» ´Þ¼ºÇϴµ¥ º» ¿¬±¸°á°ú°¡ Å« ±â¿©¸¦ ÇÒ °ÍÀ¸·Î ±â´ëµÈ´Ù. ¾Æ¿ï·¯ °ú¼¼´ç±¹ »Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó ȸ°è±âÁØ Á¦Á¤±â°ü, ¼¼¹«Á¤Ã¥°áÁ¤ÀÚ, ÇÐ°è ¿¬±¸ÀÚ, ÅõÀÚÀÚ ¹× ½Ç¹«°ü·Ã ´ç»çÀڵ鿡°Ô ȸ°èÀÌÀÍ°ú °ú¼¼¼ÒµæÀÇ Â÷ÀÌ(book-tax difference)¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ÀÌÇØ¿¡ º¸´Ù À¯¿ëÇÑ Á¤º¸¸¦ Á¦°øÇÒ °ÍÀ¸·Î ±â´ëµÈ´Ù.

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