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Associate Professor, Law School of Chonbuk National UniversityThere are four types of solutions for conflicts in Chinese foreign-investedcompanies. Consultation, mediation, arbitration and litigations. Since China¡¯sreform and opening up, China has enacted the corporation law due to thenecessity of corporate-related system as an economic unit. In accordance with thelegislation, civil and commercial litigations in China has been increasing gradually. China¡¯s state-owned enterprises has reformed into corporations which appliesto the civil law and the commercial law, contrast to the previous state-ownedenterprises which applied to the administrative law and the economic law. Corporations can be divided into two types, local-invested and foreign-investedcompanies. Foreign-invested company is that foreign investors foundindependently or by joint investment in China. There are few types offoreign-invested companies which are joint stocks, joint venture, foreign-fundedcompany, foreign-invested limited company, foreign-invested holding company. Corporate litigations in China apply to the Civil procedure code and the specialregulation for the civil action liaisons. It also includes the characteristics of both thesubstantial law and the adjective law, due to the principle of unity of civil cases. Especially, the corporation law is applied to lawsuits in People¡¯s court, and theSupreme people¡¯s court¡¯s judicial interpretation is considered in verdicts. China¡¯s classifies the legal relations in corporations into two types of internaland external conflicts. Internal conflicts are related to its organization and internal juristic relations and the external conflicts are about productions andadministration matters. This thesis is about the representative litigation types by internal conflicts of theChinese foreign-invested companies, and the effective countermeasures andprecautions for corporate litigations of foreign-invested companies in China.

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Since the modern judicial system was brought in Korea, one century and a decade have gone by, and then the electronic filing system (EFS) was introduced, which is probably one of the most significant changes in the judicial environment. Some say there is no significant symbiosis between the EFS and a firm¡¯s management. However, such a naïve comment is an easygoing way of thinking and mishandling the case. If you are a person who have same point of view, I sincerely advise you to correct your view. Like shown in the U.S. case, the adoption of EFS requires enterprises to keep up with the rapid change of their management system. Long and short term agendas also keep following the shifted managerial environment under the revision of the Rule.Any effort to chronicle all of the ramifications and impacts of the adoption of EFS to replace the paper filing systems is considerably beyond the scope of this study and would require foresight not possessed by the authors. However, there are some important specific implications that do not require inordinate speculation. This article attempts to briefly describe the more obvious impacts that firms, lawyers, and the managements can expect through the migration to EFS.Courts have created paper-based systems, which attempt to organize and store those billions of documents, as well as the huge number of documents generated by the courts themselves. In addition to creating paper-based filing systems to store documents, court staffs also manually extract and enter certain information from these filings for use in the court¡¯s internal Case Management Systems (CMS).When EFS is fully implemented, as a matter of course, there will be no paper-based record systems. Information in electronic record systems will be collected, recorded, searched, and distributed electronically. Assuming parties of those records are authorized to have access, a nearly unlimited number of people and firms, if they have some interest with pending case and only after they got court allowance, can have simultaneous access to the electronic records. Because such records will not be moved from place to place, or person to person, it is less likely to be misfiled. They can be available at all hours of the day, regardless of whether the court is open or closed. Since the information from those records will be automatically served and distributed electronically to litigants and receiving courts, the potential for errors is also greatly reduced.Moreover, no longer do information seekers (i.e., litigant, eyewitness, attorney, government agents, and researchers) need to manually search through file drawers or racks for binders to locate information in paper records. Instead, the searching can be done electronically and remotely through viewer in any place. To give some idea of the potential differences in efficiency, consider the speed of the modern electronic search engines used on the Internet.For court-related documents alone, the efficiency of immediately linking to, excerpting, or quoting from pleadings and court materials could more than streamline the practice of law. A nearly unlimited number of searchers could simultaneously retrieve such information around the clock. There is no need to re-file because the file is never moved. Those thoughts, and the logical next steps, begin to provide some idea of why universally mandated EFS is probably inevitable.I am sure of the smooth planting of the electronic discovery into Korean law in a short time after adopting the EFS. Even if it seems that currently the usage of EFS has a repercussion on the individual business association, the practice using EFS will make a soft landing in the legal field. However, the corporation would be dropped in the march of the age of limitless global competition, if the entities start to cross the bridge when the epochal changes come to it. I therefore insist that the company, regardless of its size, must note that U.S. firm¡¯s shipwreck...

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In 2010, companies were cast in the first trial of KIKO. When we compare Korean with India case, this is an unexpected outcome and irrational conclusion. KIKO has fundamental defects in structure. First, Selling Banks deceived joined companies saying that I will not receive any price. It means Zero-Cost. But they received sales costs without any explanations, inflate striking price of option and increase the term to 2-3 years injustice.KIKO is a sort of compound or exotic option. In principle currency options use to minimize the floating exchange rate in exporting companies and individuals. But KIKO was not working to do this, would rather damaged to the buyer. Furthermore buyer can not perceived this faculties in making contract. Not to notify faculties is negligence of the seller, a bank with which buyer has an account. Most of complex derivatives like KIKO have many problems, and so to have too much portion of derivatives brings about bad results. The fact that KIKO is a void contract leads to the liability of seller bank.

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Institutional investors who have the great number of securities have some characteristics. Because of the fiduciary duty to their beneficiaries, they try to improve the corporate monitering and performance. Consequently, institutional investors tend to expand their involvement in corporation. Sometimes they participate in voting contest or want to be appointed of the lead plaintiff in securities class action. Recently, institutional shareholder activism is the important issues in corporate governance While The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 has provided institutional investors with the initiative of the securities class actions in the United States of America, they may be reluctant to accept the role of lead plaintiff. Institutional investors would not take part in litigation if they don"t have the confidence about the merits of a securities claim. When institutional investors determine whether accepting lead plaintiff, they must consider how their responsibilities as ERISA fiduciaries impact their decision whether or not to litigate in a securities class action. But, institutional investors may find themselves subject to a fiduciary obligation under ERISA to take an active role where their involvement is likely to provide positive results for their beneficiaries. When acting as lead plaintiff, institutional investors usually have the greatest financial stake in the plaintiff class, therefore, more effective prosecution and settlement of meritorious claims will provide direct financial benefits to institutional investors and their beneficiaries. Such involvement yields optimal results for institutional investors directly, and provides a systemic benefit in securing the best representation of the plaintiff class, and ensures that the litigation strategy employed in such actions will be best for all involved in the long-term.

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On August 23, 2005, Sovereign Asset Management Ltd., the Dubai-based private investment fund, sold off its entire stocks in LG Group to incur a loss of over 50 billion won, and left for the Korean securities market. Despite the loss, Sovereign Asset Management Ltd. gained an net profit of 850 billion won since it gained an overall profit of over 900 billion won from recent stock sales in SK Corporation. Actually, before the Korean economic crisis in 1997, sovereign Asset Management Ltd. could not buy the stocks of domestic companies such as SK Corp. and LG Group in the Korean securities market. After the Economic crisis, the Korean government took a series of structural reform measures to improve the standard of corporate governance and to enhance corporate management, but also widely opened the financial market to foreign countries abolishing or amending some restrictions on foreign investments and introducing new securities market systems. In particular, the opening of financial market caused confusion in the Korean financial market, which had not had competitive power under the governmental governing system. Moreover, we recently faced with the "Sovereign Case," which the foreign investment fund acquired the very much profits from the domestic companies and dumped the domestic companies when the foreign investment fund decided that there were no more benefits of the domestic companies. However, after the economic crisis, we have experienced many changes. Some of the changes are very much helpful for the Korean financial market, but some are not helpful, or even painful for the Korean financial market from the perspective of the domestic companies. One example of painful changes is increasing litigations against the domestic enterprises. Since the enterprise litigations may cause the loss of the managemental efficiency, it may also bring about shrivelling of the Korean financial market. Therefore, this review examines the enterprise risks and proposes some counter measures against the enterprise litigation risks in order to improve the enterprise managemental circumstances.

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Á¤º¸°Å¹ö³Í½º´Â Á¤º¸ ÄÄÇöóÀ̾𽺠¿ä°ÇÀ» ÃæÁ·½ÃÅ°°í, Á¤º¸ °¡Ä¡¸¦ ±Ø´ëÈ­ÇÏ´Â ÇÑÆí Á¤º¸ À§ÇèÀ» ÅëÁ¦Çϱâ À§ÇÑ ÅëÇÕÀû Á¢±Ù¹ýÀÌ´Ù. ±â¾÷Á¤º¸°ü¸®¿¡¼­´Â Á¤º¸°¡ °¡Áø È°¿ë°¡Ä¡»Ó ¾Æ´Ï¶ó º¸À¯¿¡ µû¸¥ À§ÇèÀ» ÇÔ²² °í·ÁÇØ¾ß ÇÑ´Ù. ƯÈ÷ ÇØ¿Ü ½ÃÀå¿¡ ÁøÃâÇÑ ±â¾÷µéÀÌ ¼Ò¼Û°ú ÀüÀÚÁõ°Å°³½Ã¿¡ ´ëºñÇÏ·Á¸é °Ç½ÇÇÑ ±â·ÏÁ¤º¸°ü¸®¿¡ Åä´ë¸¦ µÐ Á¤º¸°Å¹ö³Í½ºÀÇ µµÀÔÀÌ ½Ã±ÞÇÏ´Ù. ÀÌ ¿¬±¸´Â ¹Ì±¹ ¹ýÁ¶°è¿¡ ¿µÇâ·ÂÀ» °¡Áø ¼¼µµ³ª ÄÁÆÛ·±½ºÀÇ Á¤º¸°Å¹ö³Í½º ¿øÄ¢À» ½ÇõÀû °üÁ¡¿¡¼­ ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿© ±â¾÷ÀÇ Á¤º¸°Å¹ö³Í½º ±¸Ãà¹æ¾ÈÀ» Á¦½ÃÇϱâ À§ÇÑ °ÍÀÌ´Ù. ÀÌ ¿øÄ¢À» ½Ç¹«¿¡ Àû¿ëÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ÅëÁ¦ ±âÁØÀ¸·Î À籸¼ºÇÑ ÈÄ ÀÌ·¯ÇÑ ÅëÁ¦ ±âÁØÀ» Á¤º¸°Å¹ö³Í½ºÀÇ ¾÷¹« ¿µ¿ªº°·Î ¹èÄ¡ÇÏ°í À̸¦ Çؼ®ÇÔÀ¸·Î½á Á¤º¸°Å¹ö³Í½ºÀÇ ±¸Ãà°ú ¿î¿µ»óÀÇ ½Ã»çÁ¡À» Á¦½ÃÇÏ¿´´Ù.

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º» ³í¹®¿¡¼­´Â ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ÀüÀÚÁõ°Å°³½Ã(E-Discovery) Á¦µµÀÇ È®»ê¿¡ µû¶ó ±¹³» µµÀÔ¿¡ ´ëºñÇÏ¿© Ç¥ÁØÈ­ µÈ ¾÷¹« ¼öÇà ÀýÂ÷ È®¸³À» À§ÇØ ¼±Çà ¿¬±¸°¡ ÀÌ·ç¾îÁö°í ÀÖ´Â EDRM(Electronic Discovery Reference Model) ¹× The Sedona Conference ÇÁ·ÎÁ§Æ®¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÐ¼®À» ¹ÙÅÁÀ¸·Î ÀϹÝÈ­ µÈ E-Discovery ÇÁ·Î¼¼½º¿Í ¼¼ºÎ ÀýÂ÷ º° Çʼö ¾÷¹« »çÇ×µéÀ» Á¦½ÃÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ ÀÌ·± ÀýÂ÷µéÀÌ ½ÇÁ¦ ¼Ò¼Û¿¡ È°¿ëµÊ¿¡ À־ ±Ùº»ÀûÀ¸·Î ³»Æ÷ÇÏ°í ÀÖ´Â ½Ã°£°ú ºñ¿ë ¹®Á¦¸¦ ÇØ°áÇϱâ À§ÇÑ ´ëü ±â¼ú·Î½á ±â°è ÇнÀ, ¿ÀÇ ¼Ò½º ÇüÅÂÀÇ Á¤º¸ °Ë»ö ¶óÀ̺귯¸®, Hadoop ±â¹ÝÀÇ ´ë¿ë·® µ¥ÀÌÅÍ ºÐ»ê ó¸® ±â¹ý µîÀ» ¼Ò°³ÇÏ°í, E-Discovery ÇÁ·Î¼¼½º »ó¿¡¼­ÀÇ È°¿ë ¹æ¾ÈÀ» Á¦½ÃÇÏ¿©, °ü·Ã ¼­ºñ½º ¹× ¼Ö·ç¼ÇÀ» °³¹ßÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â º¥´õµé¿¡°Ô À¯¿ëÇÑ Á¤º¸¸¦ Á¦°øÇÑ´Ù. ÀÌ´Â ¶ÇÇÑ Á¦µµÀû º¯È­¿¡ ¹ß¸ÂÃß¾î ¾÷¹« ½Ã½ºÅÛÀ» ÀçÁ¤ºñÇÏ°íÀÚ ÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷µé·Î ÇÏ¿©±Ý ¼Ò¼Û¿¡ º¸´Ù È¿°úÀûÀ¸·Î ´ëóÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖµµ·Ï ÇÑ´Ù.

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Nowadays Several Countries like USA and Republic of Korea introduced Electronic Litigation System in the civil sector, and this introduction of electronic system affected several changes dramatically management environments of many firms. Especially in Republic of Korea this electronic litigation system is introduced by the purpose such as decrease paper document, cost down of litigation and the transparence. but till now most enterprises don't prepare about electronic litigation.This introduction of electronic litigation system changes the circumstance of the law environment, firms have to prepare solutions about changes of litigation systems and changes of firma management systems.Key Words :

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I think that our country is not interested in the law problem of the combined corporation. But by the 2011 statistical data, the investigation numbers of the corporation combination in our country are about 543 cases and the sum total come up to 140.2trillion. Also, though there are not in the corporate law, the types of the combination corporation are 4 types in the monopoly regulations and fair trade law such as establishment of joint venture corporation, merger & acquisition, additional office and business transfer.That ration of the each type is establishment of joint venture corporation 20.6%, merger & acquisition 19.7%, additional office 12,5%, business transfer 8.8%.Notwithstanding the these cases of the combnation corporation are many, we don¡¯t discussed on the solution methods in the corporation law. Only, in the monopoly regulations and fair trade law, there are several discussion on the legal regulation. But these solution methods can not solve the related problems in the corporation law of the combination corporation. Especially, I will examine about the related problem of the derivative suit.As the totla system, first, I will inspect on the general contents of the combination corporation. Next,by the formation order of the combination corporation, I will think about the related case and solving methods.In conclusion, I will reach on the following solving method. First, I think about the studying on the change of interpretation method in the existing corporation law that consider the combination corporation problem. Second, as the certain method, we need to regulate the related law clauses that related the combined corporation, namely the parent-subsidiary corporation relation. if we are choose the latter method,I think that is ideal method.

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âÀÇÀû ¾ÆÀ̵ð¾î¸¦ Áö½ÄÀ¸·Î º¯È¯ÇÏ°í À̸¦ È°¿ëÇÏ¿© ºÎ¸¦ ÃàÀûÇϴ âÁ¶°æÁ¦ÀÇ ±¸ÇöÀº ¼¼°èÀû È­µÎÀÌÀÚ ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ Çٽɱ¹Á¤¸ñÇ¥ÀÌ´Ù. ¿ì¸®³ª¶ó´Â Áö½ÄÀç»êÀÇ Ã¢Ã⿪·®Àº ³ôÀº ¼öÁØ¿¡ ´Ù´Ù¶úÀ¸³ª ±× Áö½ÄÀç»êÀÇ È°¿ë/°ü¸® ¿ª·®Àº ºÎÁ·Çϸç ƯÈ÷ ±¹°æ ¾ø´Â ÀüÀïÀ̶ó ºÒ¸®´Â Áö½ÄÀç»êºÐÀï¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Ã¼°èÀû ´ëÀÀ°ú Àü·«Àû °ü¸® ¿ª·®Àº °³º° ±â¾÷ Â÷¿ø¿¡¼­µµ ±×¸®°í ±¹°¡ °ü¸®½Ã½ºÅÛ Â÷¿ø¿¡¼­µµ ºÎÁ·ÇÑ °ÍÀ¸·Î Æò°¡µÇ¾î ÀÌ ºÎºÐ¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿ª·®°­È­°¡ ¿ä±¸µÈ´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â Áö½ÄÀç»êºÐÀï¿¡ ´ëÇÑ Àü·«Àû °ü¸® ¿ª·®°­È­¸¦ À§ÇØ ¹«¾ùÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÑÁö¸¦ »ý°¢ÇØ º¸´Â °è±â¸¦ ¸¶·ÃÇϱâ À§ÇØ ICT À¶ÇÕÀÇ ½Ç¿ëƯÇãÀÎ ½º¸¶Æ®Æù/ÅÂºí¸´PC¸¦ Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ¿ì¸®³ª¶óÀÇ »ï¼º°ú ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¾ÖÇà °£¿¡ 9°³±¹¿¡ °ÉÃÄ µ¿½Ã´Ù¹ßÀûÀ¸·Î ÁøÇà ÁßÀÎ ±Û·Î¹ú Áö½ÄÀç»ê¼Ò¼ÛÀ» ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ƯÈ÷ ¼Ò¼Û°á°ú¿¡ µû¸¥ ±¸Á¦¼ö´Ü Áß Áï°¢ÀûÀÎ ½ÃÀåºÀ¼âÈ¿°ú°¡ ÀÖ°í °³º° ±â¾÷»Ó¸¸ ¾Æ´Ï¶ó »ê¾÷ÀÇ ÁöÇüµµ¿Í ±¹°¡°æÀï·Â¿¡ Á÷Á¢Àû ¿µÇâÀ» ¹ÌÄ¥ ¼ö Àִ ħÇرÝÁöû±¸(Á¦Ç°ÀÇ ÆǸűÝÁö¸í·É)¼Ò¼Û¿¡ ´ëÇؼ­ »ìÆ캸¾Ò´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¿ì¸®³ª¶ó ±â¾÷°ú ±Û·Î¹ú Áö½ÄÀç»ê ºÐÀïÀÌ °¡Àå ºó¹øÇÑ ¹Ì±¹¿¡¼­ÀÇ ¼Ò¼ÛÀ» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ÇÏ¿´´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸´Â ¾ÖÇÃÀÌ Á¦±âÇÑ ¿µ±¸Àû ħÇرÝÁöû±¸¼Ò¼Û¿¡ °üÇÑ ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ 1½É ÆÇ°á¹®À» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ¹Ì±¹¿¡¼­ ħÇرÝÁöû±¸°¡ ÀοëµÇ±â À§ÇÑ ¿ä°ÇÀ» ºÐ¼®ÇÏ°í, À̸¦ ¹ÙÅÁÀ¸·Î ±×¿¡ °üÇÑ ¹ý·üÀû ÀïÁ¡ÀÌ ±â¾÷ Àü·«Àû Ãø¸é¿¡¼­´Â ¾î¶°ÇÑ ½Ã»çÁ¡À» °¡Áö´ÂÁö¸¦ »ý°¢Çغ¸°íÀÚ ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ÀÌ ±ÛÀº ¾ÆÁ÷ ¼Ò¼ÛÀÌ ÁøÇà ÁßÀÎ 1½ÉÀÇ ÆÇ°á °á°ú¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ºÐ¼®ÀÌ°í ¹Ì±¹ÀÇ ¼Ò¼ÛÀ» Áß½ÉÀ¸·Î ¹ý·üÀû ÀïÁ¡°ú ±â¼ú°æ¿µÀü·«Àû ÀïÁ¡À» ¿¬°áÇÒ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¿¬°á°í¸®¸¦ ã´Â °Í¿¡ ÁßÁ¡À» µÎ°í ÀÖ´Ù´Â Á¡¿¡¼­ ÇâÈÄ ¿©·¯ ±¹°¡¸¦ ºñ±³ÇÑ Á¾ÇÕÀû ºÐ¼®ÀÌ ¿ä±¸µÇ´Â ÇÑ°è°¡ ÀÖ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª º» ¿¬±¸°¡ âÁ¶°æÁ¦½Ã´ë´Â ±â¼ú°æ¿µÀÇ ½Ã´ë¿¡¼­ ÇÑ ´Ü°è ÁøÈ­ÇÏ¿© ±â¼ú°æ¿µ°ú ¹ý·ü°æ¿µÀ» Çϳª·Î À¶ÇÕÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷ÀÇ ¿ª·®°ú ÀÚ±¹ ±â¾÷À» À§ÇØ ÃÖÀûÀÇ °ÔÀÓÀÇ ·êÀ» Á¦°øÇÏ´Â ±¹°¡ÀÇ ¿ª·®ÀÌ ¾î´À ¶§º¸´Ù Áß¿äÇÏ´Ù´Â Á¡À» °­Á¶ÇÑ´Ù´Â Á¡¿¡¼­ ±× ÀÇÀǸ¦ ãÀ» ¼ö Àֱ⸦ ±â´ëÇÑ´Ù.

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Regarding shareholder¡¯s derivative suit in China, it has only one principle provision in Chinese Corporate Act. Because enterprise with foreign investment has unique characters such as it has a small number of shareholders with totally deferent business background and culture, and most of shareholders are legal entity, and once a shareholder files derivative suit against a director it will become conflict among shareholders. Considering the above facts it is very difficult to regulate derivative suit on the enterprise with foreign investment only with one principle provision. Because of these reasons there are several problems on derivative suit on the enterprise with foreign investment such as the issues of proper plaintiff, demand on board, jurisdiction, delivery and execution of judgment. And also another problem is due to lack of specific guideline of director¡¯s responsibility, the director dispatched by foreign investor is threatened by derivative suit and can not aggressively manage the company. In order to solve these problems the most urgent task is to prepare specific procedure for derivative suit. As most of the arguments on derivative suit are arising from vacancy of specific regulations, if government prepares detailed procedure as soon as possible, it will help to decrease unnecessary dispute and increase social benefit. the second task is to prepare various methods for preventing abuse of derivative suit. For example it is necessary to make guideline clarifying the responsibility of director and strictly applying the overseas travel ban in civil suit in order not to suffer a disadvantage on the foreign director or shareholder. As a third task, delivery and execution of judgement of derivative suit on the enterprise with foreign investment are difficult and complicated due to private international law. even though delivery takes long time, it is necessary to take next legal procedure after strictly confirming receipt of lawsuit documents by the defendant. And government and scholars of Korea and China shall make an effort to set up the system to approve executive force to Chinese judgement for derivative suit with the condition that it does not has fatal defect. As stated above, it is very important to prepare the methods for foreign investor not to have a disadvantage on derivative suit, but what is the most important is foreign director, auditor and shareholder shall gain a better understanding of Chinese law and article of corporation, and make a effort to strictly keep them.

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ƯÇã ¼Ò¼ÛÀº Çõ½Å ȤÀº ÁöÀû Àç»ê±ÇÀÇ º¸È£ ¼ö´ÜÀ¸·Î¼­ ¾Ë·ÁÁ® ÀÖ´Ù. ±×·¯³ª ƯÇã ½ÃÀåÀÌ Áõ´ëµÊ¿¡ µû¶ó °æÀï»çÀÇ ÁøÀÔÀ» ¹æÇØÇϱâ À§ÇÑ Àü·«Àû ¼ö´ÜÀ¸·Î ƯÇã ¼Ò¼ÛÀÇ È°¿ë ¹üÀ§°¡ Áõ´ëµÇ¾ú´Ù. ƯÇã ¼Ò¼Û¿¡ ¿¬·çµÉ °¡´É¼ºÀº ±â¾÷ÀÌ °¡Áö°í Àִ ƯÇãÀÇ ¾çÁúÀÌ Áõ´ëÇÒ¼ö·Ï ³ô¾ÆÁø´Ù°í ¹àÇôÁ® ¿Ô´Ù. ±×·¯¹Ç·Î Çõ½ÅÀ» Ãß±¸ÇÏ´Â ±â¾÷ÀÇ ÀÔÀå¿¡¼­´Â ƯÇã ¼Ò¼Û¿¡ ¿¬·çµÉ °¡´É¼ºÀ» ÃÖ´ëÇÑ ³·Ãâ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¹æ¾ÈÀÌ ÇÊ¿äÇÏ´Ù. ÀÌ¿¡ º» ¿¬±¸´Â Àμâ ÀüÀÚ »ê¾÷ ³» ±â¾÷ÀÇ °ú°Å Á¦ÈÞ È°µ¿ÀÌ Æ¯ÇãÇ°Áú°ú ƯÇã ¼Ò¼ÛÀÇ °ü°è¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¥ ¼ö ÀÖ´Â ¿µÇâ·Â¿¡ ´ëÇØ ºÐ¼®ÇÏ¿´´Ù. ƯÇã Ç°Áú°ú ƯÇã ¼Ò¼ÛÀÇ °ü°è¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ±âÁ¸ ¿¬±¸°á°ú¸¦ Àç ÀÔÁõÇÔ°ú ´õºÒ¾î ÇÇ°íÀÎ °üÁ¡ÀÇ Æ¯Çã ¼Ò¼Û¿¡ ´ëÇÑ ¿¬±¸¸¦ ÁøÇàÇÏ¿© ±â¾÷ÀÇ Á¦ÈÞ È°µ¿ÀÌ Æ¯Çã ¼Ò¼ÛÀ» ³·Ãá´Ù´Â °á°ú¸¦ µµÃâÇÏ¿´´Ù. ¿¹ÄÁ´ë, Æò±ÕÄ¡ÀÇ Æ¯Ç㸦 Áö´Ñ ±â¾÷¿¡ ´ëÇØ °ú°Å Á¦ÈÞ È°µ¿ÀÇ À¯¹«°¡ ¿¬°£ ƯÇã ¼Ò¼Û·üÀ» ¾à 33% ³·Ãß´Â °ÍÀ» ½ÇÁõÀûÀ¸·Î ÀÔÁõÇÏ¿´´Ù. º» ¿¬±¸°¡ ƯÇã ¼Ò¼Û°ú Àü·«Àû Á¦ÈÞ¿¡ °üÇÑ ±âÁ¸ ¹®Çå¿¡ ±â¿©ÇÏ´Â ¹Ù´Â ´ÙÀ½°ú °°´Ù. ±â¾÷ÀÇ °ú°Å Àü·«Àû Á¦ÈÞ°¡ ÆòÆÇÀ¸·Î¼­ÀÇ ¿ªÇÒÀ» ÇÏ¿© ƯÇã ¼Ò¼ÛÀ» °¨¼Ò½ÃÅ´À» È®ÀÎÇÔÀ¸·Î½á ±âÁ¸ Àü·«Àû Á¦ÈÞ °ü·Ã ¹®Çå¿¡ ±â¿©ÇÑ´Ù. ¶ÇÇÑ, ƯÇã Ç°ÁúÀÌ Æ¯Çã ¼Ò¼Û¿¡ ¹ÌÄ¡´Â ¿µÇâ·Â¿¡ ´ëÇÑ »õ·Î¿î Á¶Àý º¯¼ö¸¦ ¹àÇô³¿À¸·Î½á ±âÁ¸ ƯÇã ¼Ò¼Û °ü·Ã ¹®Çå¿¡ ±â¿©ÇÑ´Ù. ´õºÒ¾î, º» ¿¬±¸´Â ƯÇã ¼Ò¼ÛÀ» ÇÇ°íÀÎ °üÁ¡¿¡¼­ ºÐ¼®ÇÑ ÃÖÃÊÀÇ ¿¬±¸¶ó´Â Á¡¿¡¼­ ¸Å¿ì Àǹ̰¡ ÀÖ´Ù.

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This study examines the association between litigation risk of client firms and audit fees. Prior studies report that audit risks borne by auditor are reflected in determining audit fees. They report that as audit risk increases, audit fee increases. The studies measure audit risk mostly by financial variables collected from financial statements, such as profitability (for instance, loss indicator variable, return on assets, or return on equity), solvency (for instance, leverage ratio or current ratio), and audit opinion (for instance, non-clean opinion or going-concern uncertainty opinion). There are many examples of such studies that use the variables mentioned above. Choi et al. (2008) examines the association between country-level auditors' legal liability and audit fees, in addition to firm-level risk variables, such as loss indicator variable, return on assets, and leverage ratio. They show that audit fee monotonically increases as country-level as well as firm-level legal liability measures increase. Seetharaman et al. (2002) also show that U.K. firms cross-listed in the U.S. pay higher audit fees than non-cross-listed firms after controlling for firm-level financial risks because cross-listing in the U. S. causes higher legal liability for auditors. Similarly, Venkataraman et al. (2008) report that initial public offering firms pay higher audit fees due to greater litigation risk, compared with existing listed-firms. This is because initial public offering firms are likely to be related to higher risks.Other than financial variables measured from financial statements, Lee et al. (2007) use directors and officers liability insurance premiums for the client firms to measure the audit risk. Similar in spirit, Pratt and Stice (1994) survey auditors for perceived audit risk of client firms. Both Lee et al. (2007) and Pratt and Stice (1994) use the measured audit risk to examine if the risk is reflected in setting audit fees.Unlike prior studies, this study uses a different and more direct measure of audit risk, the litigation risk of client firms. The litigation risk is measured by four different variables: (1) the existence of litigation for the client firms, (2) the number of litigation cases for the client firms, (3) the existence of record on the litigation in the audit report for the client firms, and (4) the amount of damage claims for the auditor for the litigation. As a result, we examine the association between audit fees and four risk measures. These four measures are not examined in prior studies. Although a prior study of Palmrose(1988) examines the association between number of litigation against auditors and audit fees, it is the study on the number of litigation against auditors, not against client firms. This study focuses on the litigation against client firms, which is different from the focus of prior studies. This is a direct measure of audit risk, because the results of the litigation greatly influence on the financial status of the firms. However, the financial variables measured from financial statements do not exactly reflect such risks. If a firm is under litigation as a defendant (measure 1), the audit risk is expected to be greate than the risk for the firms not under litigation. Second, among firms under litigation, if the number of litigation cases increases (measure 2), it is expected that the risk is greater. Third, an auditor would record the existence of the litigation only if he judges that the litigation can cause serious damage to the client firms. Thus, the existence of litigation case for which auditor records it in the audit report (measure 3) can be used to measure the audit risk. Finally, if the amount of damage claims against the auditors is greater, the result of one court case can greatly influence the financial status of a client firm. Thus, the amount (measure 4) can be used as a proxy for the audit risk. Because a firm is under litigation by suing another party (firm, individual, or governmental authorities), we use an alternative measure by calculating the net amount of damage claims (damage claims for the defendant minus damage claims as a plaintiff).For empirical analyses, we collect 2,821 firm-year observations from the companies listed in Korean Stock Exchange over the period of year 2002 to 2007. Among them, about 36.5 percent of firms (average 173 firms per year) are under litigation and the frequency of litigation increases as time passes. It may reflect the trend of increasing audit risk related to the passage of Korean version of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (so called K-SOX) in year 2002 and Class-Action Litigation Act in year 2003 and 2004. In addition, average of 146 firms have number of litigation data per year and each firm under litigation have average 9 ongoing litigation. The amount of damage claims against a client firm is 49,256,000 Korean won.Both univariate and multivariate results support the predictions. For the firms under litigation pay significantly higher audit fees than other firms not under litigation, even after controlling for other 16 variables that are reported to be related to audit fees in prior studies. These other variables represents the extent, complexity, and financial risks of audit service as well as industry and year dummies. The audit fee premiums are greater when the existence of litigation is written on audit report as a special items. Both the number of litigation and amount of damage claims against the auditors are reflected in audit fee when the regression analyses are performed with only firms that are under litigation. Various sensitivity analyses results also support the findings.Because Lee et al. (2007) uses directors and officers liability insurance premiums to measure for audit risk, this study include both client firms' litigation-related variables and the insurance premiums in the same regression model and examines if the results hold. This study consistently finds that the litigation-related variables are significantly associated with audit fees, even though the insurance premiums are insignificant or only marginally significant. The results imply that the litigation-related variables reflect the audit risk better than directors and officers liability insurance premiums. In addition, the information on premiums are available only for limited number of companies, which restricts the generalizability of the findings, compared with that of this study.In summary, the empirical findings support that auditor reflects audit risk related to the litigation of client firms in setting audit fees. Based on this finding, future studies, regulators and other information users should use the information on the litigation in evaluating client risk.

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In order to prepare for the introduction of the E-Discovery system from the United States and to cope with some causable changes of legal systems, we propose a general E-Discovery process and essential tasks of the each phase. The proposed process model is designed by the analysis of well-known projects such as EDRM, The Sedona Conference, which are advanced research for the standardization of E-Discovery task procedures and for the supply of guidelines to hands-on workers. In addition, Machine Learning Algorithms, Open-source libraries for the Information Retrieval and Distributed Processing technologies based on the Hadoop for big data are introduced and its application methods on the E-Discovery work scenario are proposed. All this information will be useful to vendors or people willing to develop the E-Discovery service solution. Also, it is very helpful to company owners willing to rebuild their business process and it enables people who are about to face a major lawsuit to handle a situation effectively.

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The overstating account is that the asset-, profit-, capital-accounts are overestimated and the debt-, loss-accounts are underestimated. Its methods are overstating the sales and goods in store, overstating the current term¡¯s net profit and understating or omitting the debt or loss, handling the accounting division, interrupting the outside auditing. The overstating account may cause the corporate lawsuits as prescribed in the Security-Related Procedure Act. I have focussed here on the indemnifying responsibility of the directors, auditors, the outside auditors and the bank¡¯s derectors. They are responsible for the loss or damage of the Corporation and the third party even though there are the president¡¯s or the owner¡¯s order regarding the overstating. If they would make a plea of innocence that they did not decide the overstating of their own will, it could not be approved by the Court. When there are any directors taking charge of the account, the president himself cannot be exempted from the duty of supervising the corporate accounts.Whether there is a cause and effect¡¯s relation between overstating account and the corporation¡¯s loss is one of difficult questions to answer simply. The auditors are responsible for the corporation¡¯s loss or damage when they have been negligent in carrying out their duties. And they are also responsible for the third party¡¯s loss when they have been negligent in carrying out their duties intentionally or by serious mistakes. So if an auditor does not carry out any duty under the situation of lacking of the inner and outer controling system over accounting, he or she must be responsible for it. The outside auditors may be responsible for the damage of the corporation or the third party if they have not written the errors made by the corporation¡¯s account- charging person. In the lawsuit about the outside auditors, the responsibility of giving the proof would be on the part of the outside auditors themselves, as most of the materials about the accounting would be within the auditors¡¯ business area. The ¡®Event Study¡¯ as used frequently in the Economics or Business administrations in not decisive in deciding the cause-effect issue, as the points of view are not always the same between the law and the ¡®Event Study¡¯ approach. The negligence offsetting method in the lawsuit can be surely allowed in deciding the sum of the account-overstaters¡¯ indemnification to the company and others who have been derectly damaged by the overstated accounts. The degree of the duty of care of the financing institutions¡¯ (eg. banks¡¯) director, manager, auditor and officer should be decided considering the quasi-public characteristic of them. In this issue, the second grade financing institutions are not quite different from the banks(the 1st grade financing institutions). Our Court have decided that the negative prescription of the directors¡¯ and auditors¡¯ indemnifying responsibility to the corporation and the third party is 10 years, which I agree with.

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