NDSL 3,531 Link page [] ư Ŭϼ.

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̹׷ ü踦 мϰ ư ̹׷ 캽ν ֱ Ⱥ ū ǰ ִ ̹׷ ȿ ִ. ̹׷ Ư ġȸ Τ׷, ŷ̷ ̷źۤ뷮 񽺰źΰݤ Ÿ ϴ ǻ ý  Ÿ ħ Ǵ ħ Ͽ ȸȥ ߱ϰų Ⱥ ħؤϴ ִ. ̹׷ ȸ ȭ ȸ Կ ϰ ı ϰ ִ. ֱٿ ν(Stuxnet) Ǽڵ ֿݽü ڷ, , ö, ݵü, ȭ ý ϴ ̹׷ ܵ ϰ ִ ̴. ̹׷ ϴ ȸ Ⱥ ʼ ۾̰ Ư 츮 ȭǾ ִ ʿ伺 ũ. δ ִ. ̹׷ ̹˸ Ѵ. 츮 , Ÿ, űݺȣ Ѵ. ó ɿ ټ кϰ Ǿ ִ ó ұ, ߺ Ÿ ִ. Ÿ, űݺȣε ̹׷ ó ʴ´. ü 鿡 ߽ Ը ϴ ٶ ̴. ̹׷ Ϲ ʹ ٸ Ư Ƿ, ׷ Ư ʿϴ. źкȣ ׷ Ϻ ϰ 뿡 ־ ϵ κ ִ. ̹׷κ Ⱥ Ϸ űݺȣ ŭ ̹׷ ʿ ü ϵ ϴ ȵ ϴ. ̹׷ å ϴٰ , ̹׷ , м, żӼ ̾Ͼ ȿ ̹׷ ϱ ִ. ̹׷ κ DZ ̺ ܱ ̷ 쿡 ǻ ǹ. ̰ ſ ª Ⱓ ظ ߱ϴ ̹׷ å ̴. ̹׷ Ͽ Ǹ ʿ䰡 ִ. ־ Jus ad Bellum Jus in Bello ִ. ̹׷ ־ Jus ad Bellum ̹׷ ִ°̴. Ư UN 51 ٰϿ Ǵµ ̴ ̹׷ °ݿ شϴ° õȴ. ذ ϰ ִ ȿ ٹ(an effects-based approach) ϸ ̹׷ ̳ 꿡 , λ, ߱ϴ 쿣 °ݿ شѴٰ ϴ ϴ. Jus in Bello 浹 ߻ ϰ ¿ Ͽ ̹ ִ°̴. ̹ ȿ 鿡 °ݰ ı ֱ ̹ ÿ ʿ伺(necessity), (distinction), ʼ(proportionality), ΰ(humanity)̶ Jus in Bello 4Ģ ؼǾ Ѵ. ̹׷ ο ʿ ̴.

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ȸں̶ θ, ö ü Ӹ ƴ϶ ׸, , , , ϼ, ڿü ϴ ¿ϴ ̴. ȸں 鿡 ߿ Ӹ ƴ϶, Ⱥ 鿡 , μ Ⱥ ģ. Ⱥ θ ְ, ֿ ޱκ Ȱϰ ָ, ż ֵ Ѵ. ׸ ̵ ϸ ż ̵ ´. ü δ밣 ӹް δ Ȱϰ ϴµ ش. ̷ ȸں ι ģ. ȸں Ⱥ ߿ νϿ, ڽ ƴ϶ Ⱥ ε ϰ, ƿ﷯ Ͼ ڿؽ ظ ̰, ִ , ö, ׸. , ü ȮѴٸ, ڿ ȿ ϴ ̴.

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The unprecedented advancement of the cutting-edged information technology bas made the game we play, the business we conduct and the politics we engage, faster and more complicated with stronger global linkage between events, which adds complexity and reduces predictability. Information revolution has generated fundamental changes in production, distribution, utilization and expansion of information itself. In this sense, information warfare has to be understood as something unprecedented since it would be highly colored by cyber terror on communication network, information hacking and cyber attacks on firewalls. The new paradigm of information warfare has challenged the traditional concept of national security and certainly required states to act upon this fast emergence of new trend. In this, information warfare is defined as the offensive and defensive use of information and information systems to deny, exploit, corrupt, or destroy, an adversary's information, information-based processes, information systems, and computer-based networks while protecting one's own. Such actions are designed to achieve advantages over military or business adversaries Information warfare is divided by MTR (Military Technical Revolution), RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) and RSA (Revolution in Security Affairs) in terms of the level of information technology and characteristics. The MTR is simply, by applying information technology to the weapon systems, the development of new weapon system. Thus, the concept of military mission is not fundamentally different from the traditional one. However, the RMA is the realization by the military that information, and information technologies must be considered as a weapon in achieving national objectives via military activity. The RMA requires comprehensive linkage and connectivity of each weapon system that must be consist of on-line network to carry a military mission. The RMA is the highest level in the information warfare which generates the larges scale changes in the concept of military mission, doctrine and national security. There are 7 types of information warfare; Command and Control warfare, Intelligence-based warfare, electronic warfare, psychological warfare, hacker warfare, economic information warfare and cyber warfare. In information warfare, the offence target has varied from states to organizations and individual. The cost of carrying a military mission has become economic. Early warning and damage assessment has become virtually impossible due to the unprecedented increases in cyber-interactions. It has become difficult to manipulate information and the public opinion as access to information is open virtually to everyone. As the concept of war itself has expanded, any place that is accessible has become combat places due to the web of information networks. Gulf War was the first information warfare where the satellite surveillance system and precision-guided weapon were used to carry combat missions. At Yugoslavia, hacker warfare has emerged as a new warfare for the first time in the history of warfare. Under these circumstances of dramatic changes in the concept of warfare, major powers surrounding the Korean peninsula are in the process of constructing measures for information warfare. The United States are the leader in driving for the MTR and the RMA in order to countermeasure any cyber attacks on its information networks. In so doing, the US is developing not only the hardware and software of information warfare but also institutionalizing legal and institutional frameworks for the new century of information warfare. Chain has already constructed information networks that links major cities and military compounds in mainland, and is in the middle of creating anti-virus operation teams to effectively manage cyber terrors on its complicated information networks. Russia, having realized its increasing dependence on the imports of computer hardware as well as software, has ..

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2000 6 15 д 55⸸ ȸ ̷ ϰ谡 ȣ ǰ ִ ̴. ̿ ȯ溯ȭ Դ ż Ⱥ  ǽ ִ° ü мϰ, ̸ ż뿡 յǴ Ⱥå ʿ伺 䱸ǰ ִ. Դ ż ִ Ⱥ ǽ Ѱ ü м , ż뿡 յǴ 米Ʒ å ϴ ̴. ̸ ⵵ ϴ 504 ż뿡 Ⱥ õ м Ͽ ٶ 米Ʒ ֺ 4 뱹 ̱ ҿ ν , 谳 Ǹ ո Ⱥ , 鳲ϵǽ ɾִ Ⱥ , 걹Ⱥ õ Ʒα׷ ȭ, 뱺米Ʒ پȭ , ϱƷù پȭ , å ȭ Ͽ.

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׷ ô Ȳ ݿ õ ޾Դ. ׷ 翡 ׷ ׷ ο ذ ǰ ־ Ȯ ʰ ִ. ȸ ϰִ ϴµ ȥ ִ ̴. , , и ̻ ߱ϴ 緡 ⸦ ̿Ͽ ǹ ǥ ڽŵ ׷ ޸ 1990 ߹ݿ 鼭 濡 ݰ θ Ͽ Ը ظ ߱ϰ ȥ ߵǴ ο ׷ Ͽ. ׷ ο ݼܵ ׷ Ű ִµ ̹, 뷮󹫱 ̿ν ΰȺ ȸȺ ̸ , , Ÿ ֿ Ⱓ Ÿ Ⱥ ü ų ִ. ̽̾ߡ ׷ ׷ Ⱥ 踦 ִ ̴. ε׽þƴ 2002 ߸ ߻ ʴ ڻź ׷ Ⱥ ġ Ÿ Ծ. ׷ Ŀ ̽̾ߡ īٰ 巯鼭 ް ߶Ͽ ڱ ̽, α ̸ Ͽ ȣִ īŸ ó J.W. ޸Ʈ ȣڿ ߰ ׷ ϴ ⸦ οϿ. ε׽þƴ ν ȸ Ұ ASEAN ɸ ۿϰ ִ. ׷ ѹݵ ƴ϶ Ͼ Ⱥ ǰ ִ. ׷ ϰ ġ, ϻ, 纸Ÿ(sabotage) ׷򿡼 ٰ̹ ÷ܼ ̿ϴ ѽġ ׷ ߱ϴ δ. ü ȸ ī ϴ ܿ ̶ø ׷̳ ׷ й ɼ ִµ 3.4, 7.7 𵵽(DDoS) ߵ ̹׷ س ִ. 9.11 ̱ ׷ ü踦 Ȯ ϰ ī ε ϴ ׷ ҽ ν ֱ װ⳻ ڻź ׷ ⵵ س Ҹ ̰ ִ. ׷ Ⱥ ϰ ȣϰ س ϴ ⿡ ִ. ׷ ʿ ܰ DZ ٸ ο ð å ϰ ׷ ȸ Ѵ. ׷ϱ ؼ ׷ Ȱ ȣϰ ޹ħ ׷ ý ȮؾѴ. Ư ׷ ð Ѵٸ Ͽ ̴. ׸ ֵ ׷ ü ȣ ν Ȱ Ǵ ġ ùε ٿ ִ. ̿Ͱ ϵĿ Ȱ Ͽ ̽ Ư ְ ð ٷ ܱȭ ƮĿ ν ڻ ׷ ȸ ̴. ƿ﷯ ۷ι Źͽ ֿ ڷν ⱸ Ͽ ° ü ׷ о߸ ϰڴ.

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ֱ а迡 ο Ⱥ ΰǰ ִ ΰȺ ؼ غ . ü ۿ 켱 ΰȺ 信 ϰ, װ а å Ȱ ִ мƲν 뼺 غ, ׸ Ⱥ ΰȺ ü мغ. 1994 UNDP ΰȺߺ ǥǸ鼭 ʷ Ұ ̷ ΰȺ ڵ Ǵ åڵ ο ŭ ˷. , ΰȺ αǰ η ϴµ ⿩ ִ ǰ ִ. ׷ ΰȺ κ ǰ ġ ̰ ȣؼ й Ǵ å ݿDZ ǰ ִ. ̷ غϱ ؼ ΰȺ ü ǵ ʿ䰡 ִ. Ȥڴ ΰȺ Ⱥ üϴ ο Ⱥ з ִٰ Ѵ. ׷, ΰȺ ȣϴµ ̴. ̴ ΰȺ . ׷ ΰκ Ⱥ 븳̱⺸ٴ ȣ صǾ Ѵ.

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ػ Ⱥ 츮 мϴ ִ. ̸ , ڴ (1) ȭ ݰ ߿伺 ϰ, (2) ذ Ȱ ִ Ⱥ ε мϸ, (3) ̿ ؾȺ ϰ ִ. ֱ Ͼ ر ߼ ǰ ִ Ⱥ ȮǼ 99.7%̻ ػۿ ϴ ػ ʿ伺 Ѵٰ ص ƴϴ. Ư 켱 ȭ ػ󱳿 Ȯ ǰ ִٴ ر ߿伺 谡ǰ ִ ̴. ٴٷ ѷ ѱ 󺸴ٵ ٴٿ Ѵ. ؾ Ȯ õǾ , ѱ ̷ ؾȺ ؾ簳߿ ޷ ֱ ̴. ׷ Ư ذ ػ Ⱥ ϰ ִ. ֺ ƴ϶ ٴٷκ ߻ ɼ ִ. 츮 ʼ ڿ ۰ Ȱ ٴٸ ̷ ̱ ̴. ̴ EEZ, NLL, ҹ, ذ߹ ǰ ִ. , ر ȭ 츮δ ػ ؾ ִ ر ÷ȭ ؾ Ѵ. °, ѱ ֺ ر , ؾκ پ Ⱥ ϰ ȿ  ر ؾѴ. θ ν Ѽ ޺ ߾ ر߰ ʿ䰡 ִ. °, ÷ܹ⸦ ž , , Ȯ ں ϰ ؾ Ѵ. Ư, ر ٽ , Ȱؾ Ѵ. ƿ﷯ α ҽÿ ر ؾ Ѵ. °, Ż ȯ ȭ 踦 Ͽ ֺ ° ϰ λ ϱ ȿ ر Ȯ ʿ䰡 ִ. ټ°, ظ ѹݵ ؿ ﰥ Ȱ ִ . ̴ Ⱥ Ȯϰ ۵ ִ. ȣŷڱ ɼ ϴ ġ ʿϴ. ѱ ڼ ڰ Ⱥȭ Ʋ ϴµ ֵ ؾ Ѵ. Ȥ ڰ س Ʒ , ȯ, ػ ü ŷڱ ü ̴. °, Ⱥ信 ؾ繮 ʿϴ. ѱ ֺ Ⱥ ؾ Ӹ ƴ϶ Ȱ ڼ ػ Ȯ ߿ϴ. ؾ繮 Ⱥ Ⱥ θ Ⱥ ľϴ ð Ǿ Ѵ.

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ó ȣ ȭ ȸ ȮǾ. , Ȱ Ÿ ū ְ Ǿ ̴. ÷ܱ , Ⱥ ߿伺 Ȯ Բ ɼ ϰ ִ. ڱ Ⱥ Ϲ Ư ϴ ġ ΰϴ WTOԹ ǹ 浹 ڰ ȥ ߱Ѵ. ٸ WTOԹ Ⱥ ϴ ġ ȭ ִ. ̿ WTO ȸ £ ڱ ΰϿٰ ɼ ϴ.
 Ⱥ ɼ Ѵ. ü ڰ ü ֿ䱹 ֿ 캻. ׸ GATT 21 Ƿʸ Ⱥ Ǵ мѴ. Ư WTO г θ Ȯ ְ Ҹ Ǵ Ǵ ġ Ǵܿ ̷ ٷ Ѵ. Ҵ ؼǾ ÷ܱ ̿ شϱ ̳ Ⱥ ִ. ְ ҿ г Ǽ Ģ Ǵ ȭϴ ȯ濡 Ǵܱμ ҸȮ ȮѴ.̷ 並 г Ⱥ Ǵ ؿ Ѱ谡 ó Ȱϴ Ⱥ ġ ϱ Ǵ ÿ ̹ϰ Ѵ.

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ѱȸ ٺȸ 6 17, дп , ̴. ⿡ ڴ, ѹݵ Ⱥ, ߼, 츮 , ׸ мϰ, ࿡ ̱ ü 鼭 츮 Ⱥ Ͽ.

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In recent years, a new topic in security studies has been revolving around the implications of communication convergence for the national security as it turns out to yield various effects upon our socio-political life. The main impetus for this research is to review security problems stemming from the conditions of the digital convergence and explore some alternatives to improve our national security system. This study came to find out that the advantage of psychological warfare in cyber space is quite apparent in the era of digital communication convergence. Firstly, it is cost-effective. Even a cash-strapped independent non-national actor, such as a terrorist group, can now engage in a very cost effective psychological warfare in cyber space using a small, independent communication networks. Korea is vulnerable to this type's new asymmetrical warfare and a very destructive aftermath of psychological warfare in cyber space.Therefore, it is the finding of this study that the government should look for more various alternatives to counter similar psychological onslaught in the future by drafting many legal and policy alternatives. While being a leading country in the field of cyber and network technology advancement, Korea is also one of the most vulnerable nations against cyber/network attacks. It is very important for Korea to prepare for future plausible cyber psychological attacks from other countries or non-national actors in order to strengthen its cyber-security and to secure national interests at large.

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߱ Ͼ 뱹̸ ѹݵ ϰ ִ. Ư ߱ ѹݵ, ߱ ѱ ſ ϴ. ߱ Ⱥ ֺ Ⱥȯ濡 ū ģ. 2023 3, ° ȭιΰȭ ּ ƴ. Ⱓ ɼ ſ ũ. ġ ̳ ߱ ̷ ̴. ü Ⱥ ñ ߱ Ⱥ ٽ ̴. ü Ⱥ Ư¡ ֿ мϴ ߱ ϴ ̴. 
 ñ ߱ Ⱥ ߿ κ ü Ⱥ Ư¡ мѴ. ߱ Ⱥ ϸ ñ ü Ⱥ ֿ Ư¡ . ü Ⱥ Ⱥ̴. 񱺻 Ⱥ ϰ ΰȺ ߽Ѵ. ׸ ° Ⱥ ϴ Ѵ.
 ƿ﷯ Ͼ, ѹݵ, ߰迡 ġ ֿ ̽ мϰ ü Ⱥ Ͼ, ѹݵ, ׸ ߰迡 ġ ŽѴ. ߱ Ⱥ Ȯ ν ߱ ѱ Ⱥ Ϳ ã ̴. ư ñ 籹 мν, ߰ ϴµ ⿩ ִ. ü Ⱥ Ⱥ Ⱥ Ѵ. 籹 ȣ ŷ Ⱥ о߿ ؾ Ѵ. ߰ ̹ ſ ߰ ִ. ߱ ѱ ȭϰ ̰ ο ϸ ϴ ÿ ι Ȯϰ ظ ؾ Ѵ.

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ֱ ̱ Ϻ ֿ䱹 Ⱥ ٰŷ ġ ϰ ׷ ߻ϴ ȮεǾ. ̿ Բ Ⱥ ϴ پȭǰ Ⱥ Ȯʿ GATT XXI Ⱥ ׿ ɰ ɼ δ. GATT ô ݱ GATT XXI Ͽ GATT WTO ذ Ǵܺٴ ܱ Ǵ ġ ذ Ǿ ɵִ м ̷ ʾ ؼ 뿡 ӵǾԴ. Ǵ κ ڱǴܼ õ 뿡 WTOذⱸ ұ ΰ Ǿ. ֱ 2019 Russia-Traffic in Transit г GATT XXI 뿡 ־ WTOذⱸ ұ Ȯ . ұ Ȯεʿ 뱹 ϴ Ȳ ǿ ġǴ ġ Ǵ ؿ ǰ δ. 
 GATT XXI Ⱥ ؼ Ȯ ϴ ǥѴ. 켱 뿡 WTO ذⱸ ұ Russia-Traffic in Transit г ȮѴ. ٽ ذⱸ Ǵ ִ ҿ 뱹 Ǵܿ Ǵ ְ ҷ мѴ. ׿ ϰ ִ и Ͽ  ġ Ⱥ Ѵ. ְ ȸ Ǵܿ Ǵ ӿ ȸ 緮 翡 ƴ ⺻Ģ ǼǿĢ Ÿ缺 Ǽ ɻ簡 . ư ְ ҵ Ǵ ÿ ؿ ν մ Ѵ. 
 ̷ 並 ٽ 鿡 ǹ̸ ϰ Ⱥ ȣ 輺 ؼ ñ WTOü Ⱥ ո ؿ ֵ Ѵ.

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After enacted on 2006, the Act on Prevention and Protection of Industrial Technology has controlled exporting National Core Technology in Korea that can have a significantly negative effect on national security or economy if it leaks out, because it has high technological or economical value. A lot of countries have the National Core Technology Export Control system for the national security reason, such as US, UK, France, Japan and China. However the problem is whether this system has a legal basis in terms of international law. Because the Export Control system takes measures to the particular country discriminately, it is possible the action violates principle of nondiscrimination in WTO/GATT agreement. It might be an illegal act. As an exception, the principle could be restricted if an action is justified by national security provision. Can the National Core Technology Export Control system invoke the clause? This papers main purpose is to consider whether the system that many countries have asserted on the ground of national security is accepted under international trade law and invokes national security provision in 1994 GATT.

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The Korean Peninsula region, where our country belongs, has been a buffer state for the neighboring powerful nations, and national security crises such as war, terrorism and assassination have continued. Though North Korea has continued various threats for the purpose of reunification through communizing South Korea after the Korean War (6.25) and extensive academic research has been required, it was never been addressed as a topic of an in-depth academic research unlike the importance and nature of the National Intelligence Service Act because of it, many times, receives a overly political interpretation Therefore, this study historically, realistically and politically examines the research backgrounds of the National Intelligence Service and the national security and explores the concept of main adversary according to the changes in our security environment, and what threats are facing us in this security environment are suggested along with the examination of development process and functions of our intelligence agency. In essence, this study reviewed the 14 Amendments to the National Intelligence Service Act, which are currently being discussed by the National Assembly and proposed the legislative direction for the amendments to the National Intelligence Service Act by demonstrating contradictions of the current law in force through In-depth discussions of 'Transferring the anticommunist investigative right of the National Intelligence Service to the National Police Agency and 'Domestic Security Information Collection Range which need to be dealt with a higher priority Lastly, for the policy and direction of the National Intelligence Service to pursue national security after effective revision of the National Intelligence Service Act, ' Implementing a human resource management system for the Intelligence Service ' Securing and expanding professional manpower and 'Establishing a intelligence agency cooperation system were suggested.

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& & ȹ ߽ Ⱥ ǥ ü ٷ. & & ȣ Ϲ̷С Ⱥ óϴ ȣ Ϲ̷п Ͽ ɴ. ⼭ ȣ Ͽ ġ, ¤ μ Ư¡ ϰ, ȣ Ư Ͽ Ѵ. ׸ ġ Ư¡μ , ¡ , ġ ǥ, ȮŹ ǰ Ǹ, ġ ΰ迡 ǰ ̾.& & ȹ С ȹ Բ д ѱ ȹ ࿡ õǴ ġ ȸ ȭ ϸ鼭 ׷ ȭ ȹ  ģ ظѴ.& & ȹ ǡ Ⱥ ǥ 븳 Ÿ ȹ Ͽ ؼ ϸ鼭 ո õ ȭ Ѵ. Ⱥ ǥ õǴ ȹ ֿ ݱü (ݱü - 3 1, ü - 7 3), ݱ ǥ( - ȹ 7 1, ǥ - ȹ 7 5), ׸ ݱü Ǵ Ž óϴ (ȹ 4 1 2ȣ)̴.

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To understand a phenomenon and to overcome it effectively, we need a lens that can see the phenomenon clearly. The meaning and type of the phenomenon look different depending on which lens we look through, and furthermore, the countermeasures and solution method for it are also different. The same goes for international relations. Alliance diplomacy, one of the various approaches to understanding the behavior of international relations, can be said to be a basic diplomatic means to maintain the balance of power between countries. The key to alliance diplomacy is the balance of power. The true purpose of alliance diplomacy is to secure a balanced power against the hostile country by forming an alliance with other countries when national security cannot be achieved on its own.
 The military value of Romania is increasing at the European level by the United States trying to strengthen NATO’s current strategic role. Romania is a very important region for the national interest of the United States. It is true that Romania, which is very close to Russia, a hostile hegemon, is also faithfully responding to changes in the security environment through an alliance with the United States.
 However, the range of mutual understanding between the United States and European countries across the Atlantic Ocean is getting narrower. Between the two powers, Europe, which provides software values such as economy and culture, and the United States, which provides hardware means such as political and military power, the scope of Romania’s movement may be narrowed. Romania is receiving economic support from the EU, a large European economic community, and security guarantees from NATO, led by the United States. Therefore, in the face of the dilemma of cooperation and discord between the two powers, Romania will have to properly adapt to the international system that is transitioning to a multipolar system by maximizing its strategic flexibility.

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The level of security posture of our military is a measure of public confidence in the usual military, which is an important factor in national security due to the nature of the military organization in which combat power is determined by fraud. Despite this importance, however, policy studies to prevent such security accidents should be conducted in various and steady ways at the level of national security strategies as military and related agencies have continued to leak defense secrets. Therefore, this study aims to present the necessity of a defense security policy based on the psychology of employees working in the military to improve the reliability of the large army for national security and to pioneer a security policy field centered on human psychology. In this study, double processing theory was used as a research method to meet this research purpose. As a result of the study, it was confirmed that System1 was stronger in both series of employees and other employees closely related to work security, and System2 was higher in series than employees of other departments. Based on this, this study proposed a defense security policy centered on human psychology.

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ִ 6.25 ߹ 60ֳ , ߾ ο ֿü, ׸ ֿ Ⱥ ü ȸ 6.25 ǹ̸ ϴ мȸ پϰ Ͽ. ̷ Ϸ ǽ() ٽ ⸮ Ⱥǽ ϰ ſ ٶ ̶ ϰڴ. ׷, װ 6.25 ڵ Ȱ ǥ ߿ Ȱ 츦 ãƺ 츮 ̴. ̿ ڴ dzȭ Ҵ ȣϱ 缱 ѳ Ȱ ڴʰԳ , ׵ 챹 ô 츮 ٷ ˾ ϴ ϰ ҷ ǥϴ ̴. ǥڴ п ü Ⱥǽ ȭǰ ִ ϰ, 6.25 ̸鿡 츮 Ȱ ־ Ͽ. ׸ 6.25 ߹ ϰ, Ư ݱ κ Բ غߴٴ ִ ԰Ͽ, ̱, , ̽, ֿ䱹 Ȱ 6.25 Ȱ ҰϿ.ƿ﷯ Ⱥ , αõ , Ư ùٸ 󸶳 ߿ Ͽ. Ư ų ɿ ̸ 6.25 ν ǽϰ ϴ ǹ Ⱥ ķΰ 6.25 츮 Ȱ 츮 ο ó ֹ μ ȣϿ. ź̳ ε 츮 ҸӴ Ӵ Ų θ Ƴ ϰ κ 츦 ν Ͻɴܰ ѹα ؾ ̴.

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۷ι Źͽ ǥǴ ο ȯ ް ȸȭ Ⱥ ȭ 䱸ϰ ִ. з ̶ νƲ Ⱥ ȭ Ȯ мϴ Ѱ迡 ָϸ鼭 νƲμ Ⱥ α׷ ¡Ѵ. Ⱥ α׷ ϳ ̷ Ư л ȭ Ȥ ȴٰ ϴ ī佺(Lakatos) α׷(scientific research program) ̴. Ⱥ Ⱥ ߽ɼ ߽ɼ ߰ ϴ Ⱥ α׷ , Ⱥ ȭ Ȯ Ⱥ о, Ⱥ о ׸ Ⱥ о о߿ Ⱥ ߽ɼ ߽ɼ Ѽ Ÿ ȴ. Ⱥ α׷ ⿡ ܼ Ⱥ Ⱥ ٺȭ Ư α׷ Ȳ Ȥ ߽ Ҹ ʰ ִٴ α׷ ɼ ְ ִ. Ⱥ Ⱥ ȭϴ ƴ϶ Ⱥ ġȺ Ư¡ ϴ Ⱥ ״ ä ȭ ǰ ִ. ᱹ 񱹰 Ȥ 񱺻 Ⱥ ߽ɼ ߽ɼ ٽ ϴ Ⱥ α׷ 鿡 򰡵 ۿ . ȭǰ ȮǴ Ⱥ Ⱥ α׷ ϴ ߰ κ Ż ʰ 󸶳 ο ϴ Ģ ľǵȴ.

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Ⱥ ȸ ֱDZ ϰ ϸ Ȯϱ ̴. ۷ι ȯ濡 ູ Ⱥ ʴ´. ̿ ֱDZ 翬 å Ⱥ ϰ ȭ õҷμ ü Ѵ. ׷ µ ȿ Ⱥ Ȯϱ ȯ̴. ׷ ó ô ܼ Ⱥ Ⱥ ΰ ƴϴ. Ⱥ Ⱥ, ȯȺ, ȭȺ, ̹ Ⱥ ΰ ü Ȱ ϴ ̴. Ⱥ ̳ ǥ ϴ. 鿡 ؼ Ǯ ٴ ̴. ׷ ⺻ ϴ ȣϱ ̰ ߻ ˸ ϰ ִ ͸ Ⱥ Ȯǰ ġ ʴ´. Ǹ ŵ ƴ õ ƴѴ. Ǹ Ǵ Ͽ ʿ 쿡 Ͽ ν , ϴ 쿡 Ǹ ħ ١ 츮 37 ܽ о ׸ ؼѴٰ ϴ 쿡, ȸ Ϲݽùο α, ϰ ħϰ װ  Ѿ ź ٰ ȸ ϴ ̰, Ϲ  ȣϴ ? ٺ ǹ ؾ Ѵ. ؿ ұϰ ȭ ÿ ȣ 簡 ٷ ̴. ̿ Ⱥ ȣϴ ⱸ ׸ Ⱥ å Ѵ. ٺ 󿡼 ġ ̳ εǴ Ⱥ ö ̳信 ȸ Ͽ ʿ ϰ ߴ. ٽ ü Ⱥ 常ϴ ͸ Ⱥ ʴ´. ǥ ̱ ֱ̳ ؿ ׸ ѱ ó Ⱥ ߿ϴ. ׷ 츮 Ϲ Ҽ . ſ ǰ ߸ Ⱥ ǽ ý̶ . ̿ ۷ι Ѱô뿡 ο Ⱥ Ⱥ¿ ׸ ó ϱ ο 鿡 ߴ. ϴٽ 2001 ̱ ֱ, 2008 ؿ , ѱ, 2004 ׷, 2003 (Domestic Security Enhancement Act) ſ ǥ Ⱥ Ȯ Ⱥ ̴. Ⱥ ʿ伺 2001 9 11 ̱ ʷ ׷ īٰ ̱ 信 õϰ ׷ ݿ Ʈ̶ 籹(FBI) 翡 ʿ伺 伺 ϰ ȮεǾ. ׷ Ⱥ α Ͽ α Դ. ̷, ε, ̶ ΰ? ׸ ȭɹ ƴѰ? Ͽ Ǵ ̶ Ÿ ׷ ҿ ټ ߴ. ׷ Ⱥ Ǻ ռ ̴. ź ̷ ٰ 丶 ȩ ũ ȸп ϴ ڿ¿ Ƿ η źŲ ȿ, ġ Ⱥ Ȯ ü ڽŵ õα ȣ ޶ ̱ ̴. ݸ鿡 Ǵ ġ ϳ ġ ̴. ׷Ƿ Ⱥ ·Ӱ ϰ Ͽ ı ִʺ 信 ʴ´. ع Ǿ å Թ ݿ Ǿ ֱDZ , , Ȯ Ⱥ Թ ü Ϻ ý DZ⸦ Ѵ. Ҿ Ⱥ ý 籸Ǿ ѹα ۷ι Ѱ£ Ϸ Ƿ 嵵 ʿ Ȯ Ⱥ Ȯϱ ؼ ⱸ ߴ ̾ ü谡 DZ⸦ Ѵ. ̿ ȭ Ⱥ ȣ Ȱ

[ؿܳ]

The purpose of this study is to analyze the changes of the Russian National Security Strategy that was announced in July 2021 and to explore implications for understanding Russian national security policy and Korea-Russia relations in the future.Russias National Security Strategy of 2021 reaffirmed Russias strengthened status in the multi-center global order, presenting the competition over values and development models as the core of global conflict and competition. This position indicates that the performance claims higher priorities over geopolitical victories in the evaluation of the development model, mirroring the Interim National Security Strategic Guidelines of the Biden Administration. Russias National Security Strategy of 2021 presents domestic renewal as the top priority of national security goal, which constituted a huge difference from the past documents of national security that were inclined to set priorities on national defense and security. However the document criticizes the West for its containment policy on Russia. The words of cooperation with EU, NATO and U.S. is removed from the document, suggesting lower priorities will be placed on the impact of security-related decisions on its cooperation with the West.Accordingly, the development of a high technology-based economy is presented as a prime task of national security policy. In addition, the document emphasized the need for space and polar development as a source of economic driving force, in which international cooperation is underlined.The emphasis on a high technology-based economic development may accelerates the economic cooperation between Korea and Russia. On the other hand, however, the growing conflicts between development models may place obstacles upon the cooperation in high-technology that crosses the border of conflicting models. Accordingly, a new frame may be needed for Korea-Russia cooperation, accommodating universal values.

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̱ Ⱥ ְ ġ Ű Ÿ Ϲ 縦 , ⼭ ߻ϴ ̳ Թ ʿ Ȥ μ ϰ ִ. ̴ ̱ Ⱥ ٰŸ ַ GATT 21 α Թ ٴ ڽ 缺 Ѹ ϰ ִ. ó ̱ 9.11 ׷ Ⱥ ְ ÷ Ⱥ ؼ Թ ̳ üʹ ޼ϰ ִ. ׷ ̱ ϴ GATT 21 ̶ ڰ ü Ǵؾ Ӹ ƴ϶ Թ ġ ؾ ̴. GATT 21 ؼ Ⱥ 뿡 ѱμ ϰ , GATT 21 ļ Թġ WTO ȸ ȣ GATT 21 ħ ؼĢ ؾ ̴. ư ̱ Ⱥ簡 ڽ ǵߴ ȿ ŵξ ʿ䰡 ִ. Ư 1974 301 ̿ ɿ ̱ Ⱥ ߴ Ͱ ޸ ȿ ų ̱ ǿ ģ ִ. 츮 ֵ ̱ Ϲ 翡 Ǿ, ̷ 簡 WTO Թ ϴ ΰ ߿ . ̿ ̱ Ϲ ֵ ٰŴ 301 ̱̾, ̷ ؼ ̶ ǹ . ׷ ۱ ̱ å ִ ȭδ Ⱥ̸ ̷ Ⱥ ؼ ̱ ̷ å ° ǰ ִ. ó Ⱥ ο ŷ ̱ Ϲ 縦 ˺ην ؾ ƴϸ Թ̶ з Ͽ ؾ ϴ ؾ ߴΰ ִٰ ̴.

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